Financial Management Workbench
A working study companion for Financial Management (09050440) at Nanjing University Business School. Built directly from Dr. Tao Yuan's lecture slides, rearranged along the syllabus agenda, and extended where the slides leave a concept hanging. Every worked number has been recomputed from the original slide data.
How this workbench is organised
the same five blocks in every lectureHow the lecture's ideas build on one another, drawn as a chain rather than a list. Cross-lecture links are marked on the map.
Explanatory prose with the slide's own worked examples taken apart step by step, plus the background the slides skip.
Every formula from the lecture in one place, with the meaning of each symbol. Printed on its own for revision.
The vocabulary, defined in English with a Chinese anchor so it maps onto the lecture you actually sat through.
Graded multiple choice plus step-by-step calculation problems, mirroring the final exam's three question types (concept explanation, single choice, subjective). Your score is stored in this browser, and the dashboard below tracks it lecture by lecture — so a week before the exam you can see exactly which lecture is still weak.
Reading the callouts
four kinds of aside, four coloursConnects a concept to another lecture. Financial management is one argument told in sequence — the discount rate that looks incidental in Lecture 2 turns out to be the cost of capital in Week 10, and the whole of Lecture 4 is Lecture 3's rule applied to messy real cash flows. These boxes are where the sequence shows.
Material the slides do not cover, taken from the textbook. Chapter numbers follow Corporate Finance, 11th ed. (the 31-chapter edition with Jaffe as third author) — the one 机械工业出版社 prints as 《公司理财(英文版·原书第11版)》, ISBN 978-7-111-58856-6. Note that Ross/Westerfield/Jordan also publish a different, 27-chapter Fundamentals of Corporate Finance whose chapter numbers do not line up; this workbench uses the 31-chapter numbering throughout.
Places where a method is easy to apply wrongly, or where something on a slide is slightly off. Three such errors were found while rebuilding these lectures — a wrong listing date, a rounding slip in an annuity-due calculation, and an intermediate-rounding artefact in a profitability-index table — and each is flagged where it occurs rather than quietly fixed.
The instructor's own discussion questions and quick questions, kept verbatim, with a worked answer below each.
Lectures
weeks 1–4 delivered so farProgress dashboard
stored locally in this browserWhat the final exam asks for
per the syllabusConcept explanation 2 × 10 marks · Single choice 2 × 35 marks · Subjective question 5 × 2 marks. The self-check blocks in each lecture are built on exactly these three shapes, so that working through them is practice for the paper rather than for its own sake.
Groups of up to 6 pick a course-related topic not taught in class and present for 10–20 minutes: definition, real-world application, and the link back to this course. The syllabus suggests LPR, fintech, independent directors, ESG, generative AI. The Roadmap tab carries a shortlist of angles worth considering.
Overview & Financial Statements
Concept Map
how the lecture buildsNearly every later lecture feeds off something introduced here. The balance sheet gives you net working capital, which becomes ΔWC — a real cash outflow — in the free cash flow of Lecture 4. The income statement gives you EBIT and depreciation, two of the three terms in that same free cash flow formula. The discount rate that appears from Lecture 2 onward is the firm's financing cost, which is the cost of capital of Week 10. And the goal of the firm stated at the end of this lecture is the criterion against which every method in Lecture 3 is judged.
Two Cases, and the Problem They Share
slides 7–10Case 1 · A CEO paid ¥1 a year
On 7 August 2015, JD.com (NASDAQ: JD) announced that its chairman and CEO Richard Liu would take a base salary of ¥1 per year for ten years, with no cash bonus. How does someone with a one-yuan salary live?
The answer is that the salary was never the compensation. Alongside it, Liu was granted a very large block of share options. His payoff therefore comes from the share price, not from the wage bill. That single design choice aligns him with outside shareholders: if he destroys value, he personally loses far more than ¥1 a year. It is also a signal, because a manager who accepts a one-yuan salary is telling the market that he expects the equity to be worth a great deal.
Liu's package is a textbook answer to the agency problem — the conflict of interest between a firm's principals (shareholders) and its agents (managers). Ross Ch. 1 sets out three ways it is contained. First, compensation contracts that tie managerial wealth to shareholder wealth, of which options are the most direct example. Second, the market for corporate control: a badly run firm becomes cheap, and a takeover then replaces the management. Third, the board of directors, which can dismiss underperforming managers.
The costs of running these mechanisms — plus the value destroyed by managers who still act in their own interest — are called agency costs. They are a debit against the firm's value, and the whole point of governance is to keep them small.
Case 2 · The same company at two prices
On 13 August 2020, CanSino Biologics (康希诺, 688185) listed on the STAR Market. Billed as "China's first COVID-vaccine stock," it opened up 124% at ¥470 and closed at ¥393.11, a first-day gain of 87.45%. On the same day, its Hong Kong listing (06185.HK) closed at HK$198.10 — roughly half the A-share price.
The slide gives the listing date as 3 August 2020. The actual STAR Market listing was 13 August 2020 — the price data on the slide (opening at ¥470, up 124%, closing at ¥393.11) matches that day exactly, and the issue price was ¥209.71. The month is right and the day is a slip. This is the third such small error found in these four decks; the others are on slide 24 of Lecture 2 and slide 25 of Lecture 3.
One company, one set of assets, one stream of future cash flows, and two prices differing by a factor of two. Neither price is an error. The A and H markets are segmented: shares are not freely convertible between them, the investor bases differ, and the liquidity and sentiment differ. The law of one price — the assumption that the same asset cannot sell at two prices at once — fails exactly when the two markets cannot arbitrage against each other.
This is the course's first statement of what valuation means. A price is not a fact about the firm; it is the output of a market in which information is incomplete and capital does not flow freely. Weeks 5–6 (stock and bond valuation) and Week 12 (raising capital) are the systematic treatment of what this slide only gestures at, and the A/H spread reappears there as the pricing puzzle it actually is.
Who is who inside the corporation
Both cases are about the same structure. The lecture lays out three groups:
- Managers (职业经理人) — executives, the general manager or president, and the functional chiefs: CFO, HR director, and so on. They run the firm day to day.
- Shareholders (股东) — major and minor holders, state-owned asset commissions (国资委), mutual, hedge and pension funds, and individuals. They own the residual claim.
- Directors (董事) — the chairman, the board, independent directors, and executive directors. They sit between the two, with a duty to the firm.
The illustration used in the lecture is Alibaba's board page, which is worth reading as an artefact rather than as a picture: it lists both executive directors with operating roles inside the company and independent directors with no operating role — the structural feature that makes a board a check rather than a rubber stamp.
What the CFO actually does
The lecture poses this as an open question. In this course the CFO is the person who stands at the junction of the three decisions the module is built on: deciding which real assets to buy (capital budgeting), deciding how to pay for them (capital structure), and managing the short-term cash position (net working capital). The CFO does not "keep the books" — that is the controller's job. The CFO's question is forward-looking: what is this worth, and should we do it?
Financial analysts as intermediaries
Investors have limited time and limited professional skill to process the information firms emit. Analysts sit in the middle: they dig through filings, talk to management, build models, and sell their conclusions to investors. This is a straightforward answer to an information problem — someone specialises in reading, and sells the reading. It is also the reason the lecture insists that corporate finance knowledge is a prerequisite for the job: an analyst who cannot do the arithmetic in Lectures 2–4 has nothing to sell.
Where to find a financial report
- The company's own website, under Investor Relations
- Regulatory disclosure: the CSRC, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
- Data vendors: WIND (万得), 同花顺, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters
- Timing: annual reports are released in March–April of the following year
The Three Statements
slides 11–18A financial statement gives investors information on the financial health of a company. The lecture works from a single consistent example — an unnamed firm, figures in millions — so that the three statements can be read against one another. The example is reproduced below in full, because every ratio and every later lecture depends on it.
Revenue is reported when it is earned, not when the cash arrives. A sale on 60-day credit is booked today and the cash shows up two months later. This single convention is why the income statement and the cash flow statement tell different stories about the same firm, and why net income is not cash. The whole of Lecture 4 rests on taking that difference seriously.
The balance sheet (资产负债表)
The balance sheet reflects the financial position of a company at one point in time — a photograph, not a film. Assets are listed in order of how long it would normally take a going concern to convert them into cash: cash first, then receivables, then inventory, then fixed assets. Cash is far more liquid than a factory.
| Balance sheet ($m) | 2020 | 2019 | Balance sheet ($m) | 2020 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | 140 | 107 | Accounts payable | 486 | 455 |
| Accounts receivable | 294 | 270 | Total current liabilities | 486 | 455 |
| Inventories | 269 | 280 | Deferred taxes | 117 | 104 |
| Other | 58 | 50 | Long-term debt | 471 | 458 |
| Total current assets | 761 | 707 | Total long-term liabilities | 588 | 562 |
| Property, plant, and equipment | 1,423 | 1,274 | Preferred stock | 39 | 39 |
| Less accumulated depreciation | (550) | (460) | Common stock ($1 par value) | 55 | 32 |
| Net property, plant, and equipment | 873 | 814 | Capital surplus | 347 | 327 |
| Intangible assets and other | 245 | 221 | Accumulated retained earnings | 390 | 347 |
| Total fixed assets | 1,118 | 1,035 | Less treasury stock | 26 | 20 |
| Total assets | 1,879 | 1,742 | Total equity | 805 | 725 |
| Total liabilities and equity | 1,879 | 1,742 |
Three identities do all the work:
The third one deserves a sentence. Capital spending is not simply the change in fixed assets, because depreciation has already been subtracted from the closing figure. Adding depreciation back undoes that, leaving the gross additions the firm actually paid for.
- Net working capital, 2020 = 761 − 486 = 275
- Net working capital, 2019 = 707 − 455 = 252
- Change in net working capital = 275 − 252 = +23
- Capital spending, 2020 = 1,118 − 1,035 + 90 = 173
These two figures are the reason this lecture is not just accounting revision. In Lecture 4, free cash
flow is defined as EBIT − Tax + Depreciation − ΔWC − Capex. The −ΔWC term is the +23
computed here, with its sign flipped: growing working capital consumes cash. The −Capex term is the
173 computed here. Both are already sitting on the balance sheet.
The income statement (损益表)
Where the balance sheet is a photograph, the income statement measures revenue and expense over a specific period. The example firm's statement reads as follows:
| Income statement ($m) | Amount | Derivation |
|---|---|---|
| Total operating revenues | 2,262 | |
| Cost of goods sold | 1,655 | |
| Selling, general, and administrative | 327 | |
| Depreciation | 90 | |
| Operating income (EBIT) | 190 | 2,262 − 1,655 − 327 − 90 |
| Other income | 29 | |
| Earnings before interest and taxes | 219 | 190 + 29 |
| Interest expense | 49 | |
| Pretax income | 170 | 219 − 49 |
| Taxes | 84 | current 71 + deferred 13 |
| Net income | 86 | 170 − 84 |
| Addition to retained earnings | 43 | |
| Dividends | 43 | 43 + 43 = 86 |
The slide labels both 190 and 219 as EBIT-adjacent, which looks like an inconsistency and is not. Line 190 is operating income — the profit from the firm's principal operations only. Line 219 adds other income (interest received, gains on asset sales, and similar items outside the core business) to arrive at earnings before interest and taxes in the full sense. Ross Ch. 2 keeps the two separate for a reason: only operating income belongs in an operating cash flow forecast. In Lecture 4 the free cash flow formula starts from EBIT, and it means the operating figure — mixing in one-off asset sale gains would corrupt the projection.
Two features of this statement matter more than the rest:
- Depreciation is a non-cash item. As the slide puts it, no firm ever writes a cheque for "depreciation." It reduces taxable income without any cash leaving the firm. This is why net income systematically understates the cash a profitable asset-heavy firm generates — and why Lecture 4 adds it back.
- Net income is not cash. It is an accrual-basis number, further distorted by non-cash charges. The lecture's blunt formulation is that a firm cannot spend its net income.
The three identities from this statement:
The cash flow statement (现金流量表)
Cash flows are hard to manipulate. That is their principal virtue, and it is why analysts go to the cash flow statement first when they distrust a set of accounts. It has three components:
- Cash flow from operating activities (CFO) — cash generated by the core business
- Cash flow from investing activities (CFI) — purchases and sales of fixed assets
- Cash flow from financing activities (CFF) — borrowing, share issuance, dividends
How the three statements lock together
The lecture's slide 18 lists three links. They are worth expanding, because this is the part of the lecture that quietly supplies the machinery for Lectures 3 and 4.
Ross Ch. 2 makes the third link concrete. Start from net income and undo the accruals:
- Add back non-cash charges — depreciation is the big one. Deducting it reduced reported profit without any cash leaving.
- Subtract increases in current assets. If receivables rose, you booked revenue you have not been paid for, so actual cash is lower than profit. If inventory rose, you spent cash building it.
- Add increases in current liabilities. If payables rose, you received goods or services you have not yet paid for — the supplier effectively financed you.
Deferred taxes belong on that list too, and they appear on both statements: $13m is charged in the income statement but not yet paid in cash, so it accumulates as a liability of $117m on the balance sheet. It is a non-cash charge for exactly the same reason depreciation is.
Applying the bridge to the example firm produces the cash flow statement the slides never actually show — reconstructed here from the balance sheet and income statement alone. It is worth building in full, because it closes the loop: the three statements stop being three documents and become one system.
| Cash flow statement ($m) — derived | Amount | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Net income | 86 | income statement |
| + Depreciation | +90 | non-cash charge |
| − Increase in receivables | −24 | 294 − 270 |
| + Decrease in inventory | +11 | 280 − 269 |
| + Increase in payables | +31 | 486 − 455 |
| − Increase in other current assets | −8 | 58 − 50 |
| + Increase in deferred taxes | +13 | 117 − 104 |
| Cash flow from operations (CFO) | 199 | |
| Capital spending | −173 | 1,118 − 1,035 + 90 |
| Cash flow from investing (CFI) | −173 | no disposals assumed |
| Net new borrowing | +13 | 471 − 458 |
| Net new equity issued | +43 | (55−32) + (347−327) |
| − Treasury stock purchased | −6 | 26 − 20 |
| − Dividends paid | −43 | income statement |
| Cash flow from financing (CFF) | 7 | |
| Net change in cash | 33 | 199 − 173 + 7 |
The reconstruction is not a guess. The balance sheet independently reports that cash moved from 107 to 140 — a change of +33. The derived statement produces 199 − 173 + 7 = +33 as well. Two routes to the same number, from different documents: that agreement is the cash flow identity doing its job, and it is the test any cash flow forecast has to pass. If your projected CFO, CFI and CFF do not sum to the change in cash you assumed, something in the projection is wrong.
Depreciation appears three times across this course, always in a different role. Here it is a non-cash
charge that must be added back to reach cash flow. In Lecture 2 it is absent entirely — the discounting
machinery deals only in cash. In Lecture 4 it becomes a tax shield worth Depreciation × T,
the most valuable thing a capital-intensive project owns. One line item, three jobs.
Financial Ratios
slide 19Ratios compress the three statements into numbers that can be compared — across time, and across firms of different sizes. The lecture groups them into five families, and the grouping itself is the lesson: liquidity, leverage, turnover, profitability, and market value are five distinct questions you can ask of the same accounts. The right-hand column below evaluates every ratio on the example firm from the previous section.
| Ratio | Formula | Example firm, 2020 |
|---|---|---|
| I · Short-term solvency (liquidity) | ||
| Current ratio | Current assets / Current liabilities | 761 / 486 = 1.57 |
| Quick ratio | (Current assets − Inventory) / Current liabilities | 492 / 486 = 1.01 |
| Cash ratio | Cash / Current liabilities | 140 / 486 = 0.29 |
| II · Long-term solvency (financial leverage) | ||
| Total debt ratio | (Total assets − Total equity) / Total assets | 1,074 / 1,879 = 0.57 |
| Debt–equity ratio | Total debt / Total equity | 1,074 / 805 = 1.33 |
| Equity multiplier | Total assets / Total equity | 1,879 / 805 = 2.33 |
| Times interest earned | EBIT / Interest | 190 / 49 = 3.88 |
| Cash coverage ratio | (EBIT + Depreciation) / Interest | 280 / 49 = 5.71 |
| III · Asset utilization (turnover) | ||
| Inventory turnover | Cost of goods sold / Inventory | 1,655 / 269 = 6.15 |
| Days' sales in inventory | 365 / Inventory turnover | 365 / 6.15 = 59.3 days |
| Receivables turnover | Sales / Accounts receivable | 2,262 / 294 = 7.69 |
| Days' sales in receivables | 365 / Receivables turnover | 365 / 7.69 = 47.4 days |
| Total asset turnover | Sales / Total assets | 2,262 / 1,879 = 1.20 |
| Capital intensity | Total assets / Sales | 1,879 / 2,262 = 0.83 |
| IV · Profitability | ||
| Profit margin | Net income / Sales | 86 / 2,262 = 3.80% |
| Return on assets (ROA) | Net income / Total assets | 86 / 1,879 = 4.58% |
| Return on equity (ROE) | Net income / Total equity | 86 / 805 = 10.68% |
| V · Market value — needs a share price, so not computable from the statements alone | ||
| Price–earnings ratio | Price per share / Earnings per share | — |
| Market-to-book ratio | Market value per share / Book value per share | — |
| EV multiple | Enterprise value / EBITDA | — |
None of these numbers is good or bad on its own. A current ratio of 1.57 might be comfortable for a manufacturer and alarming for a supermarket chain, which runs on thin liquidity and fast inventory. A high debt ratio is reckless in a cyclical industry and efficient in a stable one, because debt carries a tax shield. The only ratios that mean anything are compared — against the firm's own history, or against competitors in the same industry. Treating a ratio as a grade is the most common misuse of this slide.
The DuPont decomposition: where ROE comes from
The lecture's ratio table already contains the most useful identity in the whole list. ROE is written there as the product of three other ratios, and unpacking it answers a question a single ROE number cannot: why is this firm's return on equity what it is?
- Operating efficiency — the profit margin 86 / 2,262 = 3.80%
- Asset-use efficiency — the total asset turnover 2,262 / 1,879 = 1.2038
- Financial leverage — the equity multiplier 1,879 / 805 = 2.3342
- Multiply the three 0.03802 × 1.2038 × 2.3342 = 0.10683
The decomposition earns its keep when two firms have the same ROE for completely different reasons. A luxury goods brand gets there through a fat margin and low turnover. A discount retailer gets there through a thin margin and very high turnover. A leveraged buyout gets there through neither, and simply piles on debt. The ROE is identical in all three cases; the businesses are not remotely alike, and the risks are not alike either — the leveraged firm's ROE is the most fragile, because leverage magnifies losses as readily as gains.
The turnover ratios in group III measure how long cash is tied up, but each measures only one link. Management accounting joins them into a single number. Adding a payables ratio the slide does not list — payables turnover = COGS / accounts payable = 1,655 / 486 = 3.41, so days' payables outstanding = 365 / 3.41 = 107.2 days — gives:
For the example firm: 59.3 + 47.4 − 107.2 = −0.4 days. Essentially zero, which is a striking result. The firm collects from customers and sells its inventory in about 107 days, and takes about 107 days to pay its own suppliers. Its suppliers are financing the entire operating cycle. This is the position retailers and fast-moving consumer goods firms actively manage towards, and it explains why a firm can be profitable yet permanently short of cash — or the reverse.
It also connects directly forward. Working capital absorbs cash whenever this cycle lengthens, and that is exactly what the ΔWC term in Lecture 4's free cash flow formula subtracts. A firm whose cycle is stretching is quietly consuming cash even while its income statement looks healthy — which is the reconciliation between "profitable" and "broke" that the ratio set exists to expose.
What Financial Management Is
slides 20–27With the statements and the ratios in hand, the lecture turns to the point of the exercise. A financial manager and a financial analyst must understand four things:
What is an asset, a project, or a company worth? Everything downstream is an application of this.
How to spend money. Which long-term investments should the firm choose? → Lectures 3–4
How to raise money. How should the firm fund the investments it selected? → Week 11
How do those two decisions feed back into the value of the firm?
Finance is not accounting
The lecture draws a clean line between the two, and since you have taken 基础会计 this is worth stating precisely rather than diplomatically:
| Accounting | Finance |
|---|---|
| Historical performance — book value | Value based on future forecast — market value |
| The accuracy and reliability of financial reports | Relies on the information accounting produces |
| Backward looking, rule-based | Forward looking, requires judgement and experience |
| CPA, 会计资格考试 | CFA, FRM, 证券从业资格证, 银行从业资格证 |
The distinction is not that finance ignores accounting — the previous three sections were nothing but accounting. It is that accounting supplies a description of what happened, and finance converts that description into a forecast of what will happen. The whole of Lecture 4 is an exercise in taking accounting numbers and turning them into cash flows that can be discounted.
The goal of financial management
The traditional statement of the goal is to maximise firm value, or equivalently to maximise shareholders' wealth. The lecture emphasises what the goal is not: it is not to maximise profits.
Three reasons, all of which the exam can ask for.
Profit is an accounting construct, and it can be manipulated. Change a depreciation assumption, reclassify an expense, pull revenue forward by shipping goods early — reported profit moves without any change in underlying value.
Profit ignores the time value of money. A project that earns ¥100,000 of profit this year is not equivalent to one that earns it in five years. Profit has no time dimension; the entire subject of Lecture 2 exists because value does.
Profit ignores risk and ignores the capital employed. A firm can raise profit by issuing more shares and buying a bond portfolio; shareholders are no better off — they own a bigger firm with the same value per share. Wealth, not profit, is what accrues to the owner.
The lecture adds a modern qualification: alongside value maximisation, firms are now expected to take environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations into account. The honest way to read this is as a constraint on how value is created rather than a replacement for the objective — which is exactly the view the syllabus takes when it lists ESG as a possible presentation topic.
The slide asks: how can we distinguish investment and financing decisions? The test is which side of the balance sheet the decision touches, and whether it creates value or merely pays for it. An investment decision buys a real asset — it moves value from the left side of the balance sheet into the business, and it is appraised by whether the NPV is positive. A financing decision sells a financial asset — it moves value from the right side, and it is appraised by whether the funds are raised at a fair price. Two of the lecture's own examples make the distinction concrete: 农夫山泉 raising HK$1.1bn in an IPO is financing (selling equity); 美的 acquiring Kuka for €37.07bn is investment (buying real assets).
The lecture also states plainly that the financing decision is the less important of the two. That is a strong claim, and it is the view this course takes: the value of a firm is created principally on the investment side, and the financing decision mostly distributes that value between claimants rather than creating it. Week 11 will test how far that claim survives.
The three decisions in pictures
The lecture closes by attaching each of the three recurring questions to a part of the balance sheet — which is a way of saying that the balance sheet you learned to read in section 3 is also the map of the course.
Notice that net working capital is the one balance-sheet line that appears in all three columns. It is the output of the short-term management decision, it is financed by the capital structure decision, and — as the ΔWC term — it is a direct input to the capital budgeting decision in Lecture 4. If you want a single thread to follow through this course, working capital is a good candidate.
Formula Sheet
print-friendlyKey Concepts
the vocabularySelf-Check
15 questions · gradedGroup A mirrors the exam's concept-explanation questions, group B its single-choice section, and group C its subjective calculation questions. Everything here is answerable from the two tables in section 3.
A · Concept check
Model answer. The income statement is built on estimates and elections: how long an asset's useful life is, when revenue is considered earned, which costs are capitalised rather than expensed. Each of these judgements moves reported profit without any cash changing hands. The cash flow statement records actual transfers of cash, and cash is observable — either the money arrived or it did not.
There is a second reason. The cash flow statement is anchored: the change in the cash balance it reports must reconcile with the change in the cash line on the balance sheet. That is the identity CFO + CFI + CFF = ΔCash, and it constrains the statement in a way the income statement is not constrained. This is why analysts who distrust a set of accounts go to the cash flow statement first.
Model answer — three reasons.
1 · Timing. Profit has no time dimension. ¥100,000 of profit earned this year and ¥100,000 earned in five years are recorded identically, yet they are not worth the same. Value discounts; profit does not. This is the subject of Lecture 2.
2 · Risk. Two projects with the same expected profit are not equivalent if one is a government contract and the other a wildcat oil well. Profit records the expectation and ignores the dispersion around it.
3 · Capital employed, and manipulability. Profit can be raised simply by raising more capital — issue shares, buy a bond portfolio, and net income rises while shareholders are no better off, since they now own a larger firm with the same per-share value. And because profit is an accounting construct built on estimates, it can be moved by changing a depreciation assumption alone.
B · Multiple choice
C · Applied calculation
Starting point and adjustments. Begin at net income and undo the accruals, working through every balance sheet line that changed.
Net income 86 + Depreciation (non-cash) +90 − Increase in receivables (24) −24 294 − 270 + Decrease in inventory +11 280 − 269 + Increase in payables +31 486 − 455 − Increase in other current assets −8 58 − 50 + Increase in deferred taxes +13 117 − 104 ───── Cash flow from operations 199Why each sign. Depreciation and deferred tax are non-cash charges — they reduced reported profit without cash leaving, so they are added back. Receivables rising means revenue was booked but not yet collected, so cash is lower than profit: subtract. Inventory falling means stock was sold without being replaced, releasing cash: add. Payables rising means suppliers have not yet been paid, so they financed the firm: add. Other current assets rising consumes cash: subtract.
The check that proves it. If the figure is right, CFO + CFI + CFF must equal the change in the cash balance. Cash went from 107 to 140, a change of +33. Our financing section is +13 net borrowing, +43 net equity issued, −6 treasury purchases, −43 dividends = +7. Our investing section is the capital spending of −173. And 199 − 173 + 7 = 33. The identity closes.
Step 1 — ROE by DuPont.
ROE = margin × turnover × leverage = 0.04 × 1.5 × 2.0 = 0.12 → 12%Step 2 — double the leverage. Holding the underlying business constant, an equity multiplier of 4.0 gives 0.04 × 1.5 × 4.0 = 24%. The ROE doubles, and nothing about the firm's operations has changed.
Why to be cautious. The extra 12 percentage points are not created value — they are a transfer of risk. Leverage magnifies the return on equity only because equity has become a thinner slice of a larger asset base, so the same operating result is spread over less shareholder capital. The symmetry is the point: if ROA falls, the same multiplier magnifies the loss just as efficiently. In the limit, an equity multiplier high enough drives equity to near zero, at which point ROE becomes meaningless and the firm is simply fragile. A high ROE achieved through leverage is a signal to look at the coverage ratios — times interest earned and cash coverage — before concluding the firm is performing well.
Time Value of Money
Concept Map
how the lecture buildsNothing later works without this lecture. Lecture 3's entire apparatus — NPV — is nothing more than "discount every cash flow to today and add them up," which is the multiple-period example below, generalised. Lecture 4's free cash flows get discounted with exactly these formulas. Week 5's dividend discount model is a growing perpetuity. Week 6's bond price is an annuity plus a lump sum. If one lecture in this course has to be automatic, it is this one.
Future Value, Present Value, and Compounding
slides 2–11If a friend or relative borrows ¥1,000 from you, how much should you ask them to repay in one year?
The cultural instinct — that charging interest to family is embarrassing, and you should just take back ¥1,000 — is exactly what this lecture is designed to overturn. The lecture's answer, delivered at the end of the hour: you should ask for more than ¥1,000, because you could have put that money in 余额宝 and earned interest. Lending it to them is helping them through a difficulty; it is not a reason for you to be worse off. Being able to say "the risk-free rate is 2%, so ¥1,020" is the whole point of the next thirty slides.
Future value
Future value (终值) is the total amount due at the end of an investment. Put $10,000 in a bank at 5% for one year and your wealth grows to:
Present value
Present value (现值) is the amount you must set aside today to meet a promised payment in the future. The same arithmetic, run backwards:
Note what this says. Being promised $10,000 a year from now, when the interest rate is 5%, makes you exactly as well off as having $9,523.81 in your hand today. The $476.19 difference is the price of waiting.
Simple versus compound interest
The distinction is whether the interest itself earns interest.
The lecture's generalisation, and it is the formula the entire course runs on:
T — the number of periods over which the cash is invested · r — the appropriate interest rate, or discount rate · 1 / (1 + r)T — the present value (discount) factor, which is always less than 1
Two things follow from that last point. Because the discount factor is always below 1, discounting always
shrinks a number. And because the equation has four variables, if you know any three you can compute the
fourth — which is why a financial calculator needs only five keys: N, I/Y,
PV, PMT, FV, and solves for whichever one you leave blank.
Drawing a time line
The lecture insists on drawing time lines, and it is worth adopting the habit: it makes sign errors and off-by-one-period errors visible before they become arithmetic.
- Discount the single future cash flow back five periods PV = 20,000 / (1.15)⁵
- Evaluate the discount factor (1.15)⁵ = 2.011357 → 1 / 2.011357 = 0.497177
- Multiply 20,000 × 0.497177 = 9,943.53
Multiple periods, unequal cash flows
Real projects rarely pay a single lump sum. But once you can discount one cash flow, you can discount any number of them: discount each to today separately, then add. There is no compounding between them, because each one is being brought back to the same date.
- Discount each flow individually 200 / (1.12)¹ = 178.57 400 / (1.12)² = 318.88 600 / (1.12)³ = 427.07 800 / (1.12)⁴ = 508.41
- Add the four present values 178.57 + 318.88 + 427.07 + 508.41 = 1,432.93
Add a negative number at t = 0 for what the investment cost, and you have Lecture 3's entire method. "Discount each cash flow to today and add them up" is the definition of NPV; everything else in that lecture is commentary on how to choose r, and what to do when the answer is ambiguous.
Two conventions trip people up, and both cost marks in the exam if you are using Excel.
- Enter the rate as a decimal.
0.05, never5. - Give the present value a negative sign, treating it as an outflow. This is what lets the same function solve for any of the four variables — Excel needs to know which direction the money went.
The lecture's own practice problem is a good illustration: if we invest $25,000 at 12%, how long until we
have $50,000? The answer is =NPER(0.12, 0, -25000, 50000) = 6.1163 years. Note
pmt = 0 — there are no periodic payments, just an initial lump sum — and note the negative sign on
the $25,000. Being able to use NPER, PV, FV, PMT and
RATE fluently is, as the slide points out, a practical requirement for an investment banking or
analyst internship.
Compounding Frequency and the Effective Annual Rate
slides 13–18Everything so far assumed interest compounds once a year. In practice it often compounds more often — semi-annually, monthly, daily. The generalisation is to divide the annual rate by the number of compounding periods per year, and multiply the number of periods by the same factor.
r — always the annual (quoted) rate · m — times per year compounding occurs · T — years
The most common error in this section is plugging the periodic rate into a formula expecting an annual
one, or vice versa. The lecture repeats the warning twice, and it is worth repeating a third time: when you write
r/m, the r on top is the annual quoted rate. In the example below, 12% is the annual
rate and 6% is what actually gets applied each half-year.
- Halve the rate, double the periods periodic rate = 0.12 / 2 = 6% number of periods = 2 × 3 = 6
- Compound FV = 50 × (1.06)⁶
- Evaluate (1.06)⁶ = 1.418519 FV = 50 × 1.418519 = 70.93
The effective annual rate
That $70.93 is more than 12% simple annual compounding would have produced. Which raises the obvious question: what single annual rate would have produced the same result? That rate is the effective annual rate (EAR, 有效年利率), and it is the only honest way to compare two investments quoted on different compounding conventions.
- Set up the equivalence — find the annual rate that gets $50 to $70.93 in three years 50 × (1 + EAR)³ = 70.93
- Isolate the growth factor (1 + EAR)³ = 70.93 / 50 = 1.418520
- Take the cube root and subtract 1 1 + EAR = (1.418520)^(1/3) = 1.123600 EAR = 0.1236
The closed form is much shorter, and it is the version to memorise:
If m > 1, then EAR > r. More frequent compounding always produces a higher effective rate, because interest starts earning interest sooner. The gap is small at low rates and grows quickly: at 12%, monthly compounding gives an EAR of 12.68%, and daily gives 12.75%.
The practical consequence is a piece of consumer literacy. A loan advertised at "12% annual, compounded monthly" costs you 12.68%, not 12%. Chinese regulators require consumer credit to be quoted on a consistent basis precisely because the gap between the quoted rate and the effective rate is where borrowers get misled.
Option A: semi-annual compounding at 1.9%. Option B: 余额宝 at a 7-day annualised rate of 2%.
This looks like a trick and is not. Option A's EAR is (1 + 0.019/2)² − 1 = (1.0095)² − 1 = 1.909%. Option B's is 2%. B is better — and note that you had to convert A to a comparable basis before you could see that. That is the entire function of the EAR: it exists so that two numbers quoted on different conventions can be put side by side.
余额宝, worked properly
- After one full year — annual compounding at the quoted rate FV = 10,000 × (1 + 0.02) = 10,200 interest = ¥200
- After seven days — compound the daily rate seven times FV = 10,000 × (1 + 0.02 / 365)⁷
- Evaluate 0.02 / 365 = 0.000054794 (1.000054794)⁷ = 1.00038362 FV = 10,000 × 1.00038362 = 10,003.8362
The "7-day annualised rate" that Chinese money-market funds quote is not the same object as the EAR, and it is worth being precise about the difference. It is a backward-looking measure: take the fund's actual seven-day earnings, divide by the principal, and annualise by multiplying by 365/7 — r₇ × 365/7. Because it is a simple rather than compound annualisation, and because the underlying seven days have already happened, it tells you what the fund did last week, not what it will pay next year.
The EAR, by contrast, is a forward-looking compounding convention. They coincide only if the seven-day return repeats all year and you ignore compounding. Treating a 7-day annualised figure as a promised annual return is one of the commonest retail-investing errors.
The size of the gap is worth seeing. Simple annualisation at 2% gives ¥200 of interest on ¥10,000. True daily compounding at the same quoted rate gives 10,000 × (1 + 0.02/365)365 − 10,000 = ¥202.01, an implied EAR of 2.0201%. The difference is small at these rates precisely because 2% is small; at 12% the same discrepancy is ¥74.75 rather than ¥2.01.
Perpetuities and Annuities
slides 20–28Discounting cash flows one at a time works, but it is tedious, and for the two most common patterns it collapses into a single formula. Both patterns are streams of a constant cash flow C; they differ only in whether the stream ever stops.
Perpetuity
A perpetuity (永续年金) is a constant stream of cash flows that lasts forever. The infinite sum
converges, because the terms shrink geometrically. The result is startlingly simple:
- Apply PV = C / r PV = 15 / 0.10
- Evaluate 15 / 0.10 = 150
PV = C / r gives the value one period before the first payment. If the first $15 arrives
at t = 1, the formula values it at t = 0 — which is what we wanted here. But if the first payment arrives
today, or at t = 5, the formula is off by exactly the number of periods you need to shift it. This single
fact is the source of most errors in this topic, and the next two worked examples are both about it.
Annuity
An annuity (年金) is a constant stream of cash flows with a fixed maturity — it stops after T periods. One way to derive its value is to notice that an annuity is a perpetuity with the tail cut off: take a perpetuity starting now, subtract a second perpetuity starting at T + 1, and what remains is T payments.
The bracketed expression is the annuity factor — the present value of $1 per period for T periods. Everything about annuities follows from it.
- Convert to a monthly basis r = 0.07 / 12 = 0.0058333 T = 36
- Compute the annuity factor [1 − 1/(1.0058333)³⁶] / 0.0058333 = 32.386464
- Multiply by the payment 400 × 32.386464 = 12,954.59
Annuity due
An annuity due (即付年金) is identical except that each payment happens at the beginning of the period rather than the end — so the first $400 is paid immediately, at t = 0, and the last one at t = 35.
There is no need for a new formula. Every cash flow has simply moved one period earlier, and moving a cash flow one period earlier multiplies its present value by (1 + r). So:
- Discount the ordinary annuity to t = −1 PV₋₁ = 12,954.59 (the value one period before the first payment)
- Compound it forward one period to t = 0 12,954.59 × (1 + 0.07/12) = 12,954.59 × 1.0058333
- Evaluate = 13,030.15
Slide 24 writes the result as $13,029.56. Carrying the arithmetic through exactly — 12,954.59 × 1.0058333 — gives $13,030.15, a difference of $0.59. The slide appears to have used a rounded monthly factor rather than the full-precision 0.07/12. The method it teaches is correct and is the one shown above; only the last multiplication is slightly off. Worth knowing, because if you reproduce the slide's number by hand you will think you made the error.
333 × 24 months, or ¥7,999 up front? The lecture's answer uses 余额宝's 7-day rate of 1.38% as the opportunity cost — the return you forgo by paying early.
Discount the 24 instalments at 1.38% annual, compounded monthly (r = 0.0138/12 = 0.00115):
The instalment plan is worth ¥7,878 in today's money, against ¥7,999 for paying in full. The instalments are cheaper by ¥120.75, so take the instalment plan.
Now notice what the answer depended on. It flipped because the discount rate is low. At a 1.38% rate the deferral is nearly free and the instalments win; had the relevant rate been 20% — a credit card, or a firm with genuinely profitable projects — discounting would have hit the ¥333 payments much harder and paying in full would win. "Is the instalment worth it?" is not a question about the instalment. It is a question about your discount rate.
Delayed annuity
The third variation: the payments are a normal annuity, they simply do not start immediately. Handle it in two steps — value the annuity as if it began one period before its first payment, then discount that lump sum back to today.
- Discount each payment individually — the definition 100/1.09² + 100/1.09³ + 100/1.09⁴ + 100/1.09⁵ = 323.97
- Or, the shortcut: value it as an ordinary annuity — the ordinary-annuity formula applied to four payments values them at t = 1, one period before the first payment at t = 2 100 × [1 − 1/(1.09)⁴] / 0.09 = 323.97 (valued at t = 1)
- Then discount that single sum from t = 1 back to t = 0 323.97 / 1.09 = 297.22
Both routes agree exactly, which is the useful lesson: the annuity formula is not a different method from discounting, it is a shortcut for it.
Growing perpetuity. If the cash flow grows at a constant rate g forever, the sum converges to PV = C / (r − g), valid only when r > g. This single formula is the Gordon growth model you will meet in Week 5 as the dividend discount model; a share price is a growing perpetuity of dividends. Note the fragility: as g approaches r the denominator collapses and the value explodes, which is why terminal-value estimates in valuation are notoriously sensitive to that one assumption.
Growing annuity. The same idea with a fixed maturity: PV = C × [1 − ((1+g)/(1+r))T] / (r − g). Setting g = 0 recovers the ordinary annuity formula, which is a good way to remember it.
Loan Amortisation
slides 28–34This section is where the annuity formula stops being an abstraction. Every mortgage in China is one of these two schedules, and the difference between them is a difference in thousands of yuan of interest. The lecture classifies loans into three types:
The simplest form: the borrower receives money today and repays a single lump sum covering both principal and interest at a future date. 0 periods. A zero-coupon bond is the market-traded version.
An interest payment each period, with the full principal due at maturity. The principal balance never amortises — which is precisely why these are riskier for a lender than they look.
Repayment of principal over time, in addition to interest. Two variants, and the lecture devotes its remaining slides to the difference between them.
The running example throughout is the same in both cases: a business borrows $5,000 for five years at 9%. What changes is only which part of the payment is fixed.
Equal principal payment 等额本金
Here the principal repayment is fixed and the interest floats. The fixed principal is $5,000 / 5 = $1,000 per year, and interest each year is charged on whatever balance remains at the start of that year.
| Equal principal · $5,000 · 5 years · 9% | Begin | Payment | Interest | Principal | End |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | 5,000.00 | 1,450.00 | 450.00 | 1,000.00 | 4,000.00 |
| Year 2 | 4,000.00 | 1,360.00 | 360.00 | 1,000.00 | 3,000.00 |
| Year 3 | 3,000.00 | 1,270.00 | 270.00 | 1,000.00 | 2,000.00 |
| Year 4 | 2,000.00 | 1,180.00 | 180.00 | 1,000.00 | 1,000.00 |
| Year 5 | 1,000.00 | 1,090.00 | 90.00 | 1,000.00 | 0.00 |
| Total | 6,350.00 | 1,350.00 | 5,000.00 |
Interest declines exactly linearly, because the balance does: 450, 360, 270, 180, 90. Total interest paid over the life of the loan is $1,350.
Equal payment 等额本息
Here the total payment is fixed — the borrower pays the same amount every year — and the split between interest and principal shifts over time. That fixed payment is simply the annuity payment that amortises $5,000 over five years at 9%:
- Interest in year 1 — charged on the full opening balance 5,000 × 0.09 = 450.00
- Principal repaid in year 1 — whatever is left of the fixed payment 1,285.46 − 450.00 = 835.46
- Closing balance 5,000.00 − 835.46 = 4,164.54
- Repeat for each remaining year, always charging 9% on the opening balance Year 2: 4,164.54 × 0.09 = 374.81 → principal 910.65 → balance 3,253.88 Year 3: 3,253.88 × 0.09 = 292.85 → principal 992.61 → balance 2,261.27 Year 4: 2,261.27 × 0.09 = 203.51 → principal 1,081.95 → balance 1,179.32 Year 5: 1,179.32 × 0.09 = 106.14 → principal 1,179.32 → balance 0.00
| Equal payment · $5,000 · 5 years · 9% | Begin | Payment | Interest | Principal | End |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | 5,000.00 | 1,285.46 | 450.00 | 835.46 | 4,164.54 |
| Year 2 | 4,164.54 | 1,285.46 | 374.81 | 910.65 | 3,253.88 |
| Year 3 | 3,253.88 | 1,285.46 | 292.85 | 992.61 | 2,261.27 |
| Year 4 | 2,261.27 | 1,285.46 | 203.51 | 1,081.95 | 1,179.32 |
| Year 5 | 1,179.32 | 1,285.46 | 106.14 | 1,179.32 | 0.00 |
| Total | 6,427.31 | 1,427.31 | 5,000.00 |
Comparing the two
| Equal principal 等额本金 | Equal payment 等额本息 | |
|---|---|---|
| Payment pattern | Falls every period | Constant |
| First payment | 1,450.00 | 1,285.46 |
| Last payment | 1,090.00 | 1,285.46 |
| Total interest | 1,350.00 | 1,427.31 |
| Front-loaded? | Yes — heavier early | No |
The lecture makes an observation that is worth dwelling on: total interest is higher under the equal-payment method, and therefore "the loan officer would typically recommend you the fixed payment method."
Why is it higher? Because under equal payments the borrower repays principal more slowly in the early years — 835.46 in year 1 against 1,000 under equal principal — so a larger balance stays outstanding for longer, and interest is charged on that balance every year.
The extra interest can be traced exactly. Under equal payments the balance is higher by $164.54, $253.88, $261.27 and $179.32 at the end of years 1 through 4 — $859.01 in total across the four years in which a gap exists. At 9%, that is 0.09 × 859.01 = $77.31, precisely the difference in total interest. None of it is a fee or a hidden charge; it is simply the cost of having borrowed more, for longer.
The trade-off is genuine rather than a trick: equal payment gives you a lower payment now in exchange for more interest overall. Which is better depends entirely on your discount rate and your cash flow — the same consideration as the instalment-versus-full-price question above. But you should know which side of the trade the person recommending it is on.
Notice what the equal-payment table actually is: a $5,000 lump sum today, followed by five payments of $1,285.46. Discounted at 9%, those payments are worth exactly $5,000 — which is the definition of the yield to maturity you will meet in Week 6. A mortgage is a bond with the lender on the other side, and the YTM is the contract rate. The same table, read right to left, is a bond pricing exercise.
Formula Sheet
print-friendlyStep 2: discount that single sum to t = 0
Key Concepts
the vocabularySelf-Check
20 questions · gradedThis lecture carries more marks than any other in the course, so it carries the most questions. Bring a calculator and work each one before revealing the answer.
A · Concept check
Why EAR ≥ r. The quoted rate r is an annual figure, but when compounding occurs m times a year the interest earned partway through the year begins earning interest of its own before the year is out. Dividing the annual rate by m gives each period its share, but compounding those periods multiplies rather than adds — and multiplication of factors each above 1 exceeds the simple sum. Hence (1 + r/m)m − 1 ≥ r, with equality only when m = 1. The gap widens with both m and r: at 12% it is 0.36 points monthly, 0.75 points daily.
Why it matters. A borrower comparing two loans advertised at the same headline rate is not comparing like with like unless both are converted to an EAR. "12%, compounded monthly" costs 12.68%, not 12% — and the difference on a large long-term mortgage is substantial. This is the reason consumer-credit disclosure rules exist: without a mandated common basis, the quoted number systematically understates what the borrower pays.
Because interest is charged on the outstanding balance, and equal payment leaves that balance higher for longer.
Under equal principal, $1,000 of principal is repaid in year 1 of the $5,000 loan. Under equal payment, only $835.46 is repaid in year 1 — the rest of the fixed $1,285.46 payment goes to interest. So at the end of year 1 the equal-payment borrower still owes $4164.54 against $4,000.
That gap persists and widens. At the end of years 1 to 4 the equal-payment balance exceeds the equal-principal balance by $164.54, $253.88, $261.27 and $179.32 — $859.01 in total. Charging 9% on that extra balance produces 0.09 × 859.01 = $77.31 of extra interest, which is exactly the difference between the two totals ($1,427.31 against $1,350.00).
It is not a penalty or a fee. It is the price of the concession that equal payment offers: a lower payment in the early years, when cash is typically tightest.
B · Multiple choice
C · Applied calculation
Step 1 — monthly basis. r = 0.06/12 = 0.005; T = 48.
Step 2 — annuity factor.
[1 − 1/(1.005)⁴⁸] / 0.005 = 42.580318Step 3 — present value.
350 × 42.580318 = 14,903.11Step 4 — annuity due. Every payment moves one month earlier, so multiply by (1 + r) once:
14,903.11 × 1.005 = 14,977.63Answer. $14,903.11 if payments are at month-end; $14,977.63 if at the start — $74.52 more car, because the dealer is effectively financing you for one month less.
Step 1 — the discount rate. The relevant rate is the return you forgo by paying early, not the instalment plan's stated 0%:
r = 0.0138 / 12 = 0.00115 per monthStep 2 — present value of the 24 instalments.
PV = 333 × [1 − 1/(1.00115)²⁴] / 0.00115 = 333 × 23.658412 = 7,878.25Step 3 — compare. The instalment plan is worth ¥7,878.25 today against ¥7,999 for paying in full. Take the instalments; they are cheaper by ¥120.75.
What would change the answer. The discount rate. At 1.38% the deferral of payment is nearly free, so the instalments win. Raise the relevant rate and the ¥333 payments get discounted harder, shrinking their present value. At a 20% discount rate — a credit card, or a firm with genuinely profitable projects — the same 24 payments would be worth ¥6,542.78, and paying the ¥7,999 in full would be clearly preferable. The instalment plan's attractiveness is a statement about your opportunity cost, not about the plan.
Accept. The NPV is positive, so the project returns more than the 8% the capital could earn elsewhere. The margin is thin — $88.15 on a $5,000 outlay is 1.76% — so the decision is sensitive to the discount rate. At 9% the NPV turns negative, and the correct decision reverses.
Note what this exercise actually is: it is Lecture 3's entire method, arrived at from Lecture 2's machinery. NPV is not a new technique, it is discounting plus subtraction.
Fixed principal = 5,000 / 5 = $1,000 per year. Interest each year is 9% of the opening balance.
Year Begin Interest Principal Payment End 1 5,000.00 450.00 1,000.00 1,450.00 4,000.00 2 4,000.00 360.00 1,000.00 1,360.00 3,000.00 3 3,000.00 270.00 1,000.00 1,270.00 2,000.00 4 2,000.00 180.00 1,000.00 1,180.00 1,000.00 5 1,000.00 90.00 1,000.00 1,090.00 0.00 ─────── ──────── Total 1,350.00 6,350.00Total interest = $1,350.00, which is $77.31 less than the equal-payment method's $1,427.31.
Why. Equal principal repays $1,000 of principal in year 1 against $835.46 under equal payments, so the outstanding balance is lower in every subsequent year, and interest — charged on that balance — is lower in every year. The $77.31 difference is 9% of the $859.01 cumulative balance gap.
Step 1 — convert the bank rate to an EAR.
EAR = (1 + 0.019/2)² − 1 = (1.0095)² − 1 = 1.01909025 − 1 = 0.019090 → 1.909%Step 2 — the fund. Its 7-day annualised figure is quoted on a simple (non-compound) basis, so on a comparable basis it is 2.000%. If the seven-day performance repeated with daily compounding all year, the effective rate would be 2.0201%.
Answer. The fund is better — 2.00% against 1.909%, a margin of about 0.09 percentage points. On ¥10,000 that is roughly ¥9 a year, so it is a real but modest difference.
The point of the exercise. Before the conversion, the bank's "1.9% compounded semi-annually" looks like a smaller number than the fund's "2%" but on a basis you cannot directly compare. Only after putting both on an EAR footing is the comparison meaningful. Two caveats worth stating: the fund's quoted rate is backward-looking — it reports what the fund earned over the last seven days, not what it will pay next year — and money-market funds are not deposit-insured, whereas a bank deposit up to the insurance limit is. The 0.09-point edge is not obviously worth that difference in risk.
Net Present Value
Concept Map
how the lecture buildsThis lecture is where "valuation" as an abstraction becomes a decision rule. The discount rate r is assumed here — the lecture says only that it is the required return for an investment of this risk. Week 10 supplies it: the cost of capital is where r comes from, and the CAPM of Week 7 tells you what it should be for a given risk. And Lecture 4 takes this rule and applies it to the hard part — working out what the cash flows actually are.
Net Present Value
slides 2–10You are the CFO. An investment promises to pay $10,000 in one year and costs $9,600 now. Your interest rate is 5%. Should you buy it?
The naive answer is yes — $10,000 is more than $9,600. It is wrong. Cash flows occurring at different points in time are not directly comparable, and this slide is the sharpest possible demonstration of why.
Discount the $10,000 back one year at 5%:
PV of the inflow = 10,000 / 1.05 = 9,523.81 NPV = −9,600 + 9,523.81 = −76.19Reject the project. The present value of what you receive is less than what you pay. And note the lecture's phrasing of the alternative: you can instead put the $9,600 in the market at 5% and end the year with $10,080 — which is $80 more than the project pays you. The $76.19 NPV is the present value of that $80.
The formula and the rule
Ct — the cash flow at time t (negative at t = 0 for the investment) · r — the discount rate
Reject the project when NPV < 0.
Worked example: Finance.com
- Compute the present value factor for each year — this is 1/(1.07)t Year 1: 1/1.07 = 0.9346 Year 2: 1/(1.07)² = 0.8734 Year 3: 1/(1.07)³ = 0.8163
- Discount each cash flow 25,000 × 0.9346 = 23,364.49 20,000 × 0.8734 = 17,468.77 15,000 × 0.8163 = 12,244.47
- Total the present values 23,364.49 + 17,468.77 + 12,244.47 = 53,077.73
- Subtract the initial cost NPV = −50,000 + 53,077.73 = 3,077.73
The three PV factors are worth memorising in form even if not in value: they are simply 1/(1+r)t, and the lecture's point in tabulating them separately is that this is what a present-value table in the back of a textbook contains.
The lecture flags this and it costs people real money in practice. Excel's
=NPV(rate, CF1, CF2, …) calculates the present value of the cash flows you give it —
it does not include CF0, and it does not net anything out.
The correct construction for a net present value is:
=NPV(rate, CF1, CF2, …) + CF0with CF0 entered as a negative number outside the function. Written
=NPV(rate, CF0, CF1, CF2) instead — which is what the name invites — you would discount the initial
cost by one period as well, understating the NPV and possibly flipping the accept/reject decision.
The three steps in estimating NPV
The slide reduces the whole exercise to three inputs, and it is worth being clear that the difficulty is entirely in the first of them:
How much, and when? This is the hard part, and it is what the whole of Lecture 4 is about. Note that the slide says cash flows, not earnings.
What return does an investment of this risk command in the capital market? The lecture is explicit that this is the project's required rate — not the firm's borrowing rate, and not an arbitrary hurdle.
The easiest of the three, and the one most often got wrong anyway — because the naive figure omits opportunity costs and includes sunk costs. Lecture 4 fixes both.
Why NPV is the right rule
The lecture gives the argument directly, and it is worth following because it is the justification for everything else in this course:
- The goal of financial management is to maximise shareholder value. Established in Lecture 1.
- A firm can be viewed as the sum of many projects — some successful, some not. The firm is a portfolio of investments, bundled.
- Accepting a positive-NPV project raises the value of the firm by exactly the NPV. Not approximately — exactly. So a rule that accepts every positive-NPV project is a rule that makes the firm as valuable as it can be, and there is no other rule that does better.
The lecture notes that NPV is very sensitive to the discount rate, and that the rate "is the required rate for the investment, or the expected rate with the same risk in the capital market." That second clause is doing a lot of work, and it is worth unpacking.
The rate is not a property of the firm. It is a property of the project, and specifically of the project's risk: it is the return you could earn elsewhere in the market on an investment of comparable risk. This is why the same firm should use different discount rates for a low-risk factory expansion and a high-risk biotech venture. Using one firm-wide rate — typically the WACC of Week 10 — for every project is one of the commonest serious errors in corporate practice, because it systematically accepts the riskiest projects (which look good against a low hurdle) and rejects the safest (which look poor against a high one).
It also explains why NPV is sensitive to r in a way that is not merely mathematical. Discounting at 7% versus 10% changes the NPV of a long-dated project substantially, because the later cash flows are the ones most affected — and those are precisely the ones about which you are least certain. The sensitivity of the answer to the discount rate is a warning about the confidence you should place in it.
Internal Rate of Return — and the Four Ways It Misleads
slides 11–21The internal rate of return is the most intuitive criterion in finance, and the one managers reach for first. It is also the one that fails most spectacularly, in four separate ways. The lecture spends ten slides on the failures, which is a fair indication of where the exam interest lies.
Definition
The IRR is the discount rate that sets NPV to zero. It is the rate at which the project exactly breaks even in present-value terms — equivalently, the compound return the project earns on the capital tied up in it.
The slide's most important line about IRR is easy to skim past: "All future cash flows are assumed to be reinvested at the IRR."
This is not a technicality. To get from a set of cash flows to a single percentage, you must decide what happens to the money as it comes in, and IRR silently assumes you can redeploy each interim cash flow at the IRR itself. NPV makes no such assumption — it discounts at the market rate r, and says nothing about reinvestment.
The consequence is that IRR flatters projects with high IRRs. A project with a 40% IRR is implicitly assumed to let you reinvest every interim cash flow at 40%, which is rarely true. This is the root cause of the timing problem below, and Ross Ch. 5 gives the formal fix — the modified IRR, which separates the financing rate from the reinvestment rate.
Worked example
- Set NPV to zero and write it out 0 = −200 + 50/(1+IRR) + 100/(1+IRR)² + 150/(1+IRR)³
- There is no closed-form solution — this is a cubic in 1/(1+IRR). Solve numerically, by trial and
error or with a calculator's IRR function, or with
=IRR()in Excel. - Solution IRR = 0.1944 = 19.44%
- Check the decision — if the required return is, say, 12%, then 19.44% > 12% and the project is accepted. This will agree with the NPV rule, provided the cash flows are conventional.
The slide poses a question it does not answer, and it is a good one because it turns on the distinction between simple and compound interest.
The setup. You borrow 100 at a stated 3%.
- Plan A — repay 109 as a single lump sum three years later (一次性还本付息)
- Plan B — pay 3 at the end of each year, and repay 100 at the end of year three (每年付息到期还本)
- Plan C — repay 16, 32 and 60 over the following three years
Is 3% simple or compound? Look at Plan A's 109. Compound interest would give 100 × (1.03)³ = 109.27. Simple interest gives 100 × (1 + 0.03 × 3) = 109.00. Plan A's 109 is simple interest — and Plan A's true IRR is therefore 2.9142%, not 3%. Plan B's cash flows, by contrast, discount to exactly 100 at 3%, so its IRR is exactly 3.0000%.
Which should you choose? Compute all three IRRs (from the borrower's perspective, so the loan is an inflow at t = 0):
Plan A: 100, 0, 0, −109 IRR = 2.9142% Plan B: 100, −3, −3, −103 IRR = 3.0000% Plan C: 100, −16, −32, −60 IRR = 3.2604%Choose Plan A — the lowest effective cost. The ranking of IRRs is the ranking of the prices you are paying for the money, and as a borrower you want the cheapest.
The NPV view agrees. Evaluating each at a 3% market rate, from the borrower's side: Plan A has an NPV of +0.25 (a bargain), Plan B exactly 0 (fairly priced), Plan C −0.61 (expensive). Two criteria, same ranking, because none of these cash flows changes sign more than once.
Problem 1 · Multiple IRRs
When a project's cash flows change sign more than once, the NPV equation can have more than one root — and IRR has no way of telling you which to use.
- Test 0% — with no discounting, just add the cash flows −200 + 200 + 800 − 800 = 0 → IRR = 0% is a solution
- Test 100% — discount each flow at 100%, so divide by 2t −200 + 200/2 + 800/4 − 800/8 = −200 + 100 + 200 − 100 = 0 → IRR = 100% is also a solution
The NPV profile explains what is happening. NPV rises from zero at r = 0%, peaks at about $63 around r ≈ 29%, then falls back to zero at r = 100% and turns negative beyond it. The project is value-creating for discount rates between 0% and 100% — a fact no single number can express. Whenever the cash flow signs change more than once, this problem can occur.
Problem 2 · Are we borrowing or lending?
Consider two projects with the same IRR:
| Project | t = 0 | t = 1 | IRR | Rule at r = 10% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A — investing | −100 | +130 | 30% | IRR > r → accept |
| B — financing | +100 | −130 | 30% | IRR > r → reject |
Both have an IRR of 30%. But they are opposite transactions. Project A is an investment: you pay out 100 and receive 130, and a high return is good. Project B is borrowing: you receive 100 and pay back 130, and a high return is bad — it is the rate you are being charged.
So the IRR rule reverses direction for financing-type cash flows: accept when IRR < the required return, reject when IRR > it. The IRR number alone cannot tell you which situation you are in. The sign of the initial cash flow does.
Problem 3 · Scale, and Problem 4 · Timing
Both appear only when choosing between mutually exclusive projects, where taking one means giving up the others. The lecture defines the two cases precisely: mutually exclusive projects are those where only one of several can be chosen; independent projects are those where accepting or rejecting one does not affect the decision on the others. IRR is fine for independent projects and unreliable for mutually exclusive ones.
The scale problem is that IRR is a percentage and says nothing about how much capital is involved. A 50% return on $10 is worse than a 20% return on $1,000,000, and IRR will rank them the wrong way round.
Project A — money back early
Project B — money back late
| IRR | NPV at 10% | |
|---|---|---|
| Project A | 16.04% | $668.67 |
| Project B | 12.94% | $751.31 |
The two criteria disagree. IRR ranks A higher (16.04% against 12.94%); NPV ranks B higher ($751.31 against $668.67). They are mutually exclusive, so one must be chosen. Choose B — the NPV is what shareholders actually receive.
Why they disagree. B's cash flows arrive later, so they are discounted harder. IRR's reinvestment assumption papers over this: it credits A with being able to redeploy that early $10,000 at 16.04% for two years, which may not be possible. NPV simply discounts everything at the market's 10% and compares.
The crossover rate is worth understanding because it explains when IRR and NPV will disagree, rather than merely that they sometimes do.
Plot both projects' NPV against the discount rate and the two curves cross at 10.55%. To the left of the crossover — low discount rates — the late-cash-flow project B is worth more, because its big terminal payoff is barely discounted. To the right — high discount rates — the early-cash-flow project A is worth more, because B's distant payoff is heavily discounted while A has already banked most of its money.
Now note where the crossover sits in this example: 10.55%, against a required return of 10%. The two projects are almost equally attractive, and the entire decision hinges on a half-point of discount rate. That is not a comfortable margin, and it is the practical lesson — when the NPVs are close, the decision is fragile and the quality of your discount-rate estimate matters more than the arithmetic.
Two further tools from Ross Ch. 5 that the lecture does not cover: the discounted payback period, which fixes payback's most obvious defect by discounting the cash flows first; and the modified IRR (MIRR), which computes a single rate by separating the reinvestment assumption from the project's own return, thereby eliminating the multiple-root problem.
The verdict from the lecture
The lecture states the reconciliation cleanly, and it is worth memorising as a sentence: NPV and IRR will generally give the same decision. They diverge only in two situations — non-conventional cash flows (signs changing more than once), and mutually exclusive projects where either the initial investments differ substantially or the timing of cash flows differs substantially.
When they disagree, use NPV. The reason is not that NPV is more sophisticated but that it answers the right question directly: it measures the addition to firm value, in dollars. IRR measures a rate of return on a project whose scale and timing it cannot see.
Payback Period and Profitability Index
slides 22–32Payback period
The payback period answers a narrower question than NPV: how long does it take the project to recover its initial investment? It is the number of years until cumulative cash flow turns positive.
| Time | Cash flow | Cumulative |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | −50,000 | −50,000 |
| 1 | +30,000 | −20,000 |
| 2 | +20,000 | 0 |
| 3 | +10,000 | +10,000 |
Note that the payback period is set by management, not derived from anything. There is no theory that tells you whether two years is acceptable; the criterion is arbitrary by construction.
The advantage and the disadvantage are the same fact. By ignoring all cash flows after the payback date, payback gives the same answer for a project that limps to break-even and then stops, and for one that goes on to generate enormous profits for a decade.
Work the Finance.com example through payback and you get 2.33 years — the cumulative flow reaches −$5,000 after two years, and the third year's $15,000 clears it in a third of a year. That single number is identical for a project with an NPV of $3,077.73 and for one with an NPV of $0. A rule that cannot see the value it is supposed to be measuring is not a valuation criterion; it is a liquidity screen, and should be used as one.
Profitability index
The profitability index restores the missing ingredient — the time value of money — by putting present values back into a ratio:
| Project | C0 | C1 | C2 | PV of C1,C2 | PI | NPV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | −20 | 70 | 10 | 70.47 | 3.52 | 50.47 |
| 2 | −10 | 15 | 40 | 45.28 | 4.53 | 35.28 |
| 3 | −10 | −5 | 60 | 43.37 | 4.34 | 33.37 |
- Notice that the budget binds. All three projects have PI > 1 and positive NPV, so unconstrained you would take all three — but that costs $40m and you have $20m.
- Rank by NPV and you get the wrong answer. Project 1 has the highest NPV at $50.47m, and it consumes the entire budget. That is the trap: the NPV rule assumes you can fund everything profitable.
- Rank by PI instead. Project 2 (4.53) and project 3 (4.34) come first, cost $20m between them, and deliver a combined NPV of 35.28 + 33.37 = $68.65m.
- Compare. Project 1 alone: $50.47m. Projects 2 and 3: $68.65m. Take 2 and 3.
The slide shows the PV column as 70.5, 45.3 and 43.4, and the PI column as 3.53, 4.53 and 4.34. The exact figures are 70.47, 45.28 and 43.37, giving PIs of 3.52, 4.53 and 4.34. The discrepancy is only in project 1, and it arises because 70.5 / 20 = 3.525 rounds up to 3.53, whereas 70.47 / 20 = 3.5236 rounds to 3.52. The slide is internally consistent; the table above uses unrounded intermediate figures. It changes nothing about the decision.
Everything at once: the lecture's capstone example
| Year | Project A | Project B |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | −$200 | −$150 |
| 1 | $200 | $50 |
| 2 | $800 | $100 |
| 3 | −$800 | $150 |
| Project A | Project B | |
|---|---|---|
| CF0 | −200.00 | −150.00 |
| PV of CF1–3 | 241.92 | 240.80 |
| NPV | 41.92 | 90.80 |
| IRR | 0% and 100% | 36.19% |
| PI | 1.2096 | 1.6053 |
Reading the results. Project B wins on every criterion that can be trusted — higher NPV, higher PI, and a single unambiguous IRR. Project A is a textbook case of non-conventional cash flows: it returns everything by year 1, then demands a large outflow in year 3. It has two IRRs, at 0% and 100%, which is the multiple-root problem appearing in a genuine capital-budgeting exercise rather than a constructed one.
And payback? The cumulative flow for A runs −200, 0, +800, 0. It reaches zero at year 1 and again at year 3. So payback is 1 year, or 3 years? The criterion has no way to say. B's cumulative flow runs −150, −100, 0, +150, giving an unambiguous payback of 2 years.
The lecture's answer is honest about the gap between theory and practice: some firms use payback, others use something else, and the most frequently used technique among large corporations is either IRR or NPV. When the two produce opposite conclusions, choose NPV.
The surveys behind that claim are worth knowing, because they explain why this lecture spends so long criticising a method firms keep using. Graham and Harvey's well-known survey of CFOs found IRR and NPV used by roughly three-quarters of large firms, with payback still used by more than half — often alongside NPV rather than instead of it. The reconciliation is that payback is not really competing with NPV: it is answering a different question, about liquidity and about how long capital is exposed. A firm can sensibly use NPV to decide and payback to prioritise within a capital constraint.
The other reason IRR persists is presentational, and the lecture names it: it is easy to understand and communicate. "This project returns 36%" is a sentence a board can act on. "$90.80 of net present value" is not, without a page of explanation. That is a real advantage, and it is why the correct response to IRR is not to abandon it but to know precisely when it lies.
Formula Sheet
print-friendlyKey Concepts
the vocabularySelf-Check
18 questions · gradedThe examinable content here is as much about when each criterion fails as about computing them. The concept questions below are weighted accordingly.
A · Concept check
Why NPV is superior. Three reasons, and they are independent of one another.
1 · It measures the right thing directly. The goal of the firm is to maximise shareholder value. A firm is a portfolio of projects, and accepting a positive-NPV project raises the firm's value by exactly the NPV. NPV is therefore denominated in the objective itself — dollars of value. No other criterion is.
2 · It has no technical defects. NPV works for conventional and non-conventional cash flows alike, for independent and mutually exclusive projects alike, and for lending and borrowing alike. IRR fails in all four of those dimensions.
3 · It makes no hidden assumptions. NPV discounts at the market rate and says nothing about what happens to interim cash flows. IRR silently assumes they are reinvested at the IRR — an assumption that flatters exactly the projects with the highest IRRs, and that is rarely true.
Why firms still use IRR. Because a percentage is a form of communication that a dollar figure is not. "This project returns 36%" is actionable in a board meeting in a way that "$90.80 of net present value" is not, without explanation. IRR also makes comparison across projects of different sizes feel intuitive, even though that intuition is precisely the scale problem. The sensible practice — and the lecture's recommendation — is to use NPV for the decision and IRR for the conversation.
How it happens. IRR is defined by setting NPV to zero. Written out, that is a polynomial in 1/(1+IRR) whose degree equals the number of periods. A polynomial can have as many real roots as its highest power, so a project with several periods can in principle have several discount rates that zero its NPV.
The practical trigger is the number of sign changes in the cash flow stream. Conventional cash flows — one outflow followed by inflows, a single sign change — produce exactly one IRR. Every additional sign change adds the possibility of another root. A project that pays out, then requires a large refurbishment outflow, then pays out again, has two sign changes and may have two IRRs.
Worked case. Cash flows of −200, +200, +800, −800 have two sign changes. NPV is zero at both 0% and 100%. NPV is in fact positive for every discount rate between them, peaking at $63 around 29%. A single number cannot express that shape.
What to do. Abandon IRR for that project and read the NPV profile — the graph of NPV against the discount rate. It shows which discount rates make the project worth doing, which is the information the decision actually needs. If a single summary number is required, the modified IRR (MIRR) computes a unique rate by assuming interim cash flows are reinvested at the cost of capital rather than at the IRR itself.
B · Multiple choice
C · Applied calculation
NPV.
500/1.09 = 458.72 500/(1.09)² = 420.84 400/(1.09)³ = 308.87 ──────── PV of inflows = 1,188.43 NPV = 1,188.43 − 1,200 = −11.57IRR. Solve −1,200 + 500/(1+r) + 500/(1+r)² + 400/(1+r)³ = 0.
IRR = 8.4383%Profitability index.
PI = 1,188.43 / 1,200 = 0.9904Payback period.
Cumulative: −1,200 → −700 → −200 → +200 Payback = 2 + (200/400) = 2.50 yearsDecision: reject. All three value criteria agree, which is worth noting — they usually will for a conventional cash flow stream. NPV is negative (−$11.57); IRR of 8.44% is below the required 9%; PI is below 1 at 0.9904.
The instructive part. Payback is 2.5 years, which sounds unambiguously acceptable — most managers would call a two-and-a-half-year payback a good project. But the project destroys value. Payback cannot see this, because it cannot see that the $400 in year 3, discounted at 9%, is worth only $308.87. This is the lecture's criticism of payback demonstrated on a single project rather than asserted.
The conflict. IRR ranks A higher; NPV ranks B higher. Because the projects are mutually exclusive, choosing one means forgoing the other, so the two criteria give genuinely incompatible advice.
The cause. This is the timing problem. B's large payoff is deferred to year 3, while A returns almost everything in year 1. IRR's reinvestment assumption credits A with redeploying that early $10,000 at 16.04% for two further years — an assumption that may not be achievable. NPV makes no such assumption; it discounts every cash flow at the market's 10% and simply compares totals.
Which governs: NPV. The objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder value, and NPV measures the addition to that value in dollars. B adds $751.31 of value against A's $668.67 — $82.64 more. Choosing A would leave $82.64 on the table.
The fragility worth noting. The crossover rate at which the two NPVs are equal is 10.55% — only half a percentage point above the required return. A small error in estimating the discount rate would flip the decision. When NPVs are this close, the quality of the discount-rate estimate matters more than the arithmetic.
No — a raw NPV comparison is not valid here, because the two machines have different lives. B's higher NPV partly reflects the fact that it is delivering benefits for five years rather than two. To compare them you must put them on the same footing, which means converting each NPV into an equivalent annual amount.
NPV of each.
Annuity factor, 2 yrs @10% = [1 − 1/(1.1)²]/0.1 = 1.7355 Annuity factor, 5 yrs @10% = [1 − 1/(1.1)⁵]/0.1 = 3.7908 Machine A: NPV = −200 + 140 × 1.7355 = −200 + 242.98 = 42.98 Machine B: NPV = −400 + 130 × 3.7908 = −400 + 492.80 = 92.80Equivalent annual annuity. Divide each NPV by its own annuity factor:
EAA_A = 42.98 / 1.7355 = 24.76 per year EAA_B = 92.80 / 3.7908 = 24.48 per yearAnswer: choose Machine A. On a per-year basis it delivers $24.76 of value against B's $24.48.
Why the ranking flipped. NPV asks "which project is worth more in total?" and answers B, because B runs for five years. EAA asks "which project creates more value per year of operation?" and answers A. When the machines are alternatives providing the same service, the second question is the right one — you will buy replacements either way.
Sanity check. Over a ten-year horizon, you would buy A five times (2-year life each) or B twice (5-year life each). Discounting the equivalent annual amounts over ten years:
A: 24.76 × 6.1446 = 152.15 B: 24.48 × 6.1446 = 150.43A wins, by a margin of $1.72. The margin is small — this is genuinely close — but the method is what matters: comparing unequal lives on raw NPV would have given the wrong answer with considerably more confidence.
Capital Budgeting
Concept Map
how the lecture buildsLook at the free cash flow formula again: EBIT − Tax + Depreciation − ΔWC − Capex. Every term is
something Lecture 1 introduced. EBIT and depreciation come from the income statement. ΔWC is the
change in net working capital — the 761 − 486 arithmetic from the balance sheet. Capex is that same lecture's
capital spending = ending fixed assets − beginning fixed assets + depreciation.
What Lecture 4 adds is not new arithmetic. It is the judgement about which of those accounting quantities belong in the forecast at all, and the discipline of converting accrual figures into cash.
Which Cash Flows Count
slides 3–8The lecture states its six rules on a single slide, and then spends five slides unpacking them. The first is the principle; the rest are its consequences.
Not accounting earnings. The difference between the cash flows with the project and the cash flows without it.
Do not matter. Already incurred, whatever you decide.
Do matter. Using an asset forgoes whatever else it could have earned.
Do matter — both erosion and synergy.
We want incremental after-tax cash flows. Tax is a cash flow, and it is often the largest single line.
Does matter. Compare real cash flows at real rates, or nominal at nominal — never mix them.
Discount cash flows, not earnings. The lecture's justification is a single sentence worth remembering verbatim: earnings do not represent real money that you can spend.
This is not a technical preference. Earnings are an accrual construct shaped by depreciation schedules, revenue-recognition rules and provisions — all of which are choices. Two identical projects can report different earnings because of a different depreciation method, while having identical cash flows. Cash flows are what the firm actually receives and pays, and they are what the discounting machinery of Lecture 2 can operate on.
The lecture's honest framing of the workload is worth noting too: much of the work in evaluating a project lies in taking accounting numbers and generating cash flows. The finance is easy; the conversion is the job.
Sunk costs 沉没成本
A sunk cost has already occurred, regardless of whether the project goes ahead. Because it is unchanged by the decision, it is not incremental — and therefore irrelevant to it.
The lecture's example is a consulting fee paid before the investment decision was made. In the Baldwin case below, a $250,000 marketing test has already been paid. It is a real cost, it will appear in the accounts, and it must be excluded from the analysis entirely.
Excluding sunk costs is simple in principle and psychologically difficult in practice. Having spent $250,000 on a study, the instinct is that the money should count for something — that abandoning the project now would "waste" it. But the $250,000 is gone either way. The only question that matters is whether the remaining investment is worth making, and the answer to that question cannot depend on a cost that has already been paid.
This is the sunk cost fallacy, and it is the single most expensive error in corporate investment decisions. The rational question is always forward-looking: given where we are now, is the next dollar worth spending?
Opportunity costs 机会成本
An opportunity cost arises when an asset could be used for something else. If the project consumes it, the revenue from that alternative use is lost — and that loss is a genuine cost of the project, even though no invoice is ever issued.
The lecture's example: a warehouse the firm owns. If the project is not taken, the warehouse can be sold. Taking the project means forgoing that sale, so the forgone proceeds are a cash flow attributable to the project. In the Baldwin case the same logic applies to the factory site, valued at $150,000.
The slide asks: if taking the project means you lose the return you could have earned by putting the money in the capital market — a bank deposit, say — is that an opportunity cost?
Economically, yes. It is a real cost, and a substantial one. But it is not treated as a cash flow in the capital budgeting calculation, and understanding why is one of the most important points in the lecture.
The lecture's resolution is on the next slide, and it is a matter of the accounting rather than the economics: financing cost is not included in the calculation of cash flows, but is reflected in the discount rate.
Why? Because double-counting is the alternative. The discount rate r is the required return of the firm's investors — the same forgone return, expressed as a rate. Discounting the project's cash flows at r already charges the project for the capital it uses. If you also subtracted the forgone interest from the cash flows, you would be charging it twice, and you would reject projects that should be accepted.
So the rule to carry into the exam: interest expense never appears in a project's cash flows. It is in the discount rate, where it belongs.
Financing costs 融资成本
The lecture lists the sources of project finance — internal cash flow, debt financing, equity financing — and makes clear that none of them is free. Each carries a cost: opportunity cost, interest expense, dividends, or the dilution implied by issuing shares at a low price.
That identity is the hinge between this lecture and Week 10. The cost the firm bears for its capital is exactly the return its investors demand — the same number observed from the two sides of the transaction. And it is captured in one place only:
Side effects 副作用
A project does not exist in isolation: it acts on the firm's other products. Both directions count, and both must be taken into the incremental cash flow.
Erosion is often treated as a reason to reject a project — "it would cannibalise our own sales." That framing is usually wrong, and the reason is worth stating.
The question is never whether a new product takes sales from an old one. It is what would happen if you did not launch it. If a competitor launches the competing product instead, your customers leave anyway — and you lose the sales without gaining the new product's margin. In that case launching and cannibalising yourself is strictly better than being cannibalised by someone else.
Erosion only counts as a genuine cost to the extent that the lost sales would not have been lost anyway. This is why incremental thinking is the discipline the whole lecture is built on: the relevant comparison is always "the firm with the project" against "the firm without it," not "with the new product" against "a hypothetical world where nothing ever changes."
Free Cash Flow
slides 9–10Free cash flow is the quantity that gets discounted. The lecture defines it as the cash flow left to shareholders and debtholders under the going concern assumption. The word "free" is doing specific work: it means the firm is free to spend the money — nothing further is required to keep the project running.
The lecture notes that the going concern assumption means "certain investment in fixed assets and working capital is required." That is the whole reason Part 2 of the formula exists.
A project that is assumed to continue operating must replace worn-out equipment and must carry the inventory and receivables that its sales require. Neither is optional, and both consume cash. So free cash flow is not simply the profit from operations — it is what is left after funding the investments needed to keep the operation going. A project can be profitable and still have negative free cash flow in a growth year, because growth in working capital absorbs more cash than the profit generates.
The two parts
The formula's treatment of depreciation looks contradictory at first: it is subtracted to reach EBIT, then added straight back. The reason is that depreciation does two separate jobs.
As an expense, it reduces taxable income — so EBIT is lower than it would be, and the tax bill is lower. That is a real cash benefit. As a non-cash charge, it involves no cash leaving the firm, so adding it back restores the cash figure.
Written the other way round, the same fact gives the tax shield form of the formula:
Now it is explicit: the project's operating cash flow is its after-tax margin, plus Depreciation × T
— a cash saving that exists only because depreciation is deductible. For a capital-intensive project, that second
term is often the difference between a positive and a negative NPV. It is also why Lease-versus-Buy decisions
(Ross Ch. 21) turn almost entirely on who can claim the depreciation shield.
The Baldwin Company
slides 11–19 · Ross 6.2This is the lecture's centrepiece and the exam's most likely long question: a complete capital budgeting analysis, built from the facts up. The slide header identifies it as Textbook 6.2, which is Ross Corporate Finance 11e, §6.2 — the same example, with the same numbers.
Every figure in this example is in $1,000s. A revenue of "100.00" means $100,000. The slide notes "Unit (1,000)" at the bottom of the first table, and it is easy to lose a factor of a thousand by the end of a five-table calculation.
The facts
Market value of the proposed factory site, which the firm already owns: $150,000
Cost of the bowling ball machine: $100,000, depreciated under MACRS 5-year
Increase in net working capital: $10,000
Production, in units, over the machine's five-year life: 5,000 · 8,000 · 12,000 · 10,000 · 6,000
Price in year 1: $20, rising 2% per year thereafter
Production cost per unit in year 1: $10, rising 10% per year thereafter
Tax rate: 34% · Discount rate: 10%
Step 0 · Separating the relevant cash flows
Before any arithmetic, the six rules from section 2 dispose of two of the facts above:
Step 1 · Capital spending and working capital — Cash Flow Part 2
The investing side of the project. There are three components: the machine, the factory site, and the working capital commitment. All figures in $1,000s.
| Year | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Bowling ball machine | −100.00 | 21.76 | ||||
| (2) Accumulated depreciation | 20.00 | 52.00 | 71.20 | 82.72 | 94.24 | |
| (3) Adjusted basis after depreciation | 80.00 | 48.00 | 28.80 | 17.28 | 5.76 | |
| (4) Opportunity cost (factory site) | −150.00 | 150.00 | ||||
| (5) Net working capital (end of year) | 10.00 | 10.00 | 16.32 | 24.97 | 21.22 | 0 |
| (6) Change in net working capital | −10.00 | −6.32 | −8.65 | 3.75 | 21.22 | |
| (7) Cash Flow Part 2 = (1) + (4) + (6) | −260.00 | −6.32 | −8.65 | 3.75 | 192.98 |
This trips people up. Look at row (5): net working capital is 10.00 at the end of year 0 and 10.00 at the end of year 1. The change is therefore zero, and the slide leaves the cell blank rather than printing a 0.
The $10,000 commitment is made at t = 0, which is why row (6) shows −10.00 in the year-0 column. It is not made again in year 1. If you mechanically subtracted successive NWC figures you would double-count it and understate the NPV.
The working capital requirement is driven by the scale of operations. It starts at 10.00 at t = 0, and the slide gives the balances through to zero at the end of year 5, when the project winds down and the working capital is released.
| Year end | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NWC balance | 10.00 | 10.00 | 16.32 | 24.97 | 21.22 | 0 |
| Change | +10.00 | 0 | +6.32 | +8.65 | −3.75 | −21.22 |
| Cash flow impact (−ΔWC) | −10.00 | 0 | −6.32 | −8.65 | +3.75 | +21.22 |
The timing is why it matters at all. In years 2 and 3 the project is growing and absorbs cash; in year 5 it releases 21.22 back in a single lump. Discounted at 10%, that sub-stream has a present value of −5.98: committing cash early and recovering it five years later costs about $5,980 in today's money. A growing project therefore destroys value through working capital alone, before any question of operating profit arises.
Step 2 · Sales revenue slide 15
Revenue each year is units × price, where the price grows at 2%:
- Year 1 — the base case, no growth applied 5,000 × $20.00 = $100,000 → 100.00
- Year 2 — price has grown once 8,000 × [$20 × (1.02)¹] = 8,000 × $20.40 = $163,200 → 163.20
- Year 3 — price has grown twice 12,000 × [$20 × (1.02)²] = 12,000 × $20.808 = $249,696 → 249.70
- Years 4 and 5 10,000 × $21.22416 = $212,242 → 212.24 6,000 × $21.64864 = $129,892 → 129.89
Step 3 · Operating costs slide 16
The same structure, but the cost per unit grows at 10% — much faster than the 2% price growth. This divergence is deliberate in the example, and it is why the project's margins compress sharply by year 5.
- Year 1 5,000 × $10.00 = $50,000 → 50.00
- Year 2 8,000 × [$10 × (1.10)¹] = 8,000 × $11.00 = $88,000 → 88.00
- Years 3 to 5 12,000 × $12.10 = $145,200 → 145.20 10,000 × $13.31 = $133,100 → 133.10 6,000 × $14.641 = $87,846 → 87.85
Note what is happening to the margin. In year 1 the firm makes $10 per unit. By year 3 the cost is $12.10 against a price of $20.81 — a margin of $8.71. By year 5 the cost is $14.64 against a price of $21.65 — a margin of just $7.01. Costs are growing five times as fast as price.
Step 4 · Depreciation and the MACRS schedule slide 17
The machine costs $100,000 and is depreciated under the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) on a five-year schedule. MACRS is an accelerated method: it front-loads the depreciation, which front-loads the tax shield.
| MACRS 5-year | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | Year 4 | Year 5 | Year 6 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rate | 20.00% | 32.00% | 19.20% | 11.52% | 11.52% | 5.76% | 100.00% |
| Depreciation on $100,000 | 20.00 | 32.00 | 19.20 | 11.52 | 11.52 | 5.76 | 100.00 |
The schedule runs to six years, but the machine is sold at the end of year 5. The final 5.76% — $5,760 — is therefore never taken as a depreciation charge, and that is exactly why the machine's book value at sale is $5,760.
This is not a coincidence and it is worth seeing: accumulated depreciation at the end of year 5 is 20.00 + 32.00 + 19.20 + 11.52 + 11.52 = 94.24, so the adjusted basis is 100.00 − 94.24 = 5.76 — precisely the unclaimed final year. The row (3) figures in the Step 1 table are this running calculation.
Step 5 · Taxable income, tax, and net income slides 17–18
| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (8) Sales revenue | 100.00 | 163.20 | 249.70 | 212.24 | 129.89 |
| (9) Operating costs | −50.00 | −88.00 | −145.20 | −133.10 | −87.85 |
| (10) Depreciation | −20.00 | −32.00 | −19.20 | −11.52 | −11.52 |
| (11) Income before taxes | 30.00 | 43.20 | 85.30 | 67.62 | 30.53 |
| (12) Tax at 34% | −10.20 | −14.69 | −29.00 | −22.99 | −10.38 |
| (13) Net income | 19.80 | 28.51 | 56.30 | 44.63 | 20.15 |
Net income is computed and then — in a sense — set aside. It never enters the final cash flow calculation.
It appears because the lecture is following the textbook's exposition, and because seeing the accrual figure next to the cash figure is the point. Check the two against each other for year 1: net income is 19.80, but cash flow from operations is 39.80. The difference is exactly the 20.00 of depreciation — the non-cash charge.
So the final table subtracts taxes from revenue and costs, not net income. Tax is a cash outflow; net income is an accounting construct that has already had a non-cash charge taken out of it.
Step 6 · Cash Flow Part 1 slide 19
The operating side of the project: revenue, less the cash costs, less the tax actually paid. Note that depreciation is not subtracted — it is not a cash cost. Its only effect on cash is through the tax bill, which is already accounted for.
| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Sales revenue | 100.00 | 163.20 | 249.70 | 212.24 | 129.89 |
| (2) Operating costs | −50.00 | −88.00 | −145.20 | −133.10 | −87.85 |
| (3) Taxes | −10.20 | −14.69 | −29.00 | −22.99 | −10.38 |
| (4) Cash Flow Part 1 = (1) − (2) − (3) | 39.80 | 60.51 | 75.50 | 56.15 | 31.67 |
The lecture gives three equivalent approaches to Part 1, and checking that they agree is the best available self-test of whether you have understood the tax treatment.
| Approach | Formula | Year 1 |
|---|---|---|
| Top-down | Sales − Costs − Taxes | 100 − 50 − 10.20 = 39.80 |
| Bottom-up | Net income + Depreciation | 19.80 + 20.00 = 39.80 |
| Tax shield | (Sales − Costs)(1 − T) + Dep × T | 50 × 0.66 + 20 × 0.34 = 39.80 |
All three give 39.80, and they will keep agreeing in every year — the algebra is identical, just rearranged. Use whichever suits the data you have been given. The tax shield form is the most informative when depreciation policy is the thing in question; the bottom-up form is the fastest when you already have a projected income statement.
Step 7 · Combining the two parts, and the NPV slide 19
| Year | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (4) Cash Flow Part 1 | 39.80 | 60.51 | 75.50 | 56.15 | 31.67 | |
| (5) Cash Flow Part 2 | −260 | −6.32 | −8.65 | 3.75 | 192.98 | |
| (6) Incremental cash flow (4) + (5) | −260 | 39.80 | 54.19 | 66.85 | 59.90 | 224.65 |
| Year | Cash flow | Discount factor | Present value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | −260.00 | 1.0000 | −260.00 |
| 1 | 39.80 | 0.9091 | 36.18 |
| 2 | 54.19 | 0.8264 | 44.79 |
| 3 | 66.85 | 0.7513 | 50.23 |
| 4 | 59.90 | 0.6830 | 40.91 |
| 5 | 224.65 | 0.6209 | 139.49 |
| NPV | 51.59 |
Small print worth knowing. Discounting the table's rounded cash flows gives 51.5948; the rounded present-value column above sums to 51.60, a 0.01 difference from column rounding. Carrying full precision through every intermediate step instead gives 51.5913. All three agree at 51.59, which is the figure the lecture reports — so the discrepancy is presentational, not substantive. Use the slide's own cash flows in the exam and round only at the end.
The salvage value, in full
The year-5 cash flow of 224.65 contains three separate items, and the tax treatment of the machine's sale is worth working through on its own because it is a common exam question.
- Find the book value (adjusted basis) — what depreciation has left on the books 100.00 − 94.24 = 5.76 ($5,760)
- Compute the taxable gain — the market value exceeds the book value, so there is a capital gain 30.00 − 5.76 = 24.24
- Compute the tax due on that gain 0.34 × 24.24 = 8.242 ($8,242)
- Arrive at the after-tax salvage value — the cash you actually keep 30.00 − 8.242 = 21.758 → 21.76
So the year-5 Cash Flow Part 2 of 192.98 is:
The commonest error here is to tax the full $30,000 of proceeds. That is wrong, and the reason is that depreciation has already given the firm a tax benefit on most of the machine's cost.
Over five years the firm deducted $94,240 of depreciation, reducing its taxable income by that amount and saving 0.34 × 94,240 = $32,042 in tax along the way. If the machine could then be sold for $30,000 with no tax consequence, the firm would have deducted nearly the whole cost and recovered a third of it in cash — a double benefit. Taxing the gain of $24.24 claws the excess back.
Note what this means in the loss case. If the machine sold for less than its $5,760 book value, the project would generate a capital loss and produce a tax credit — a positive cash flow. An asset whose market value has collapsed is worth less than nothing on the tax side, and the analysis has to reflect that.
If you remember nothing else from this example, remember that the analysis consumed $260,000 up front — machine, forgone factory sale, and working capital — and produced an NPV of $51.59 thousand. And remember the number that is not there: the $250,000 marketing test, excluded as a sunk cost. In the exam, being able to say why it is excluded is worth more than reproducing the table.
Three Routes to the Same Number, Inflation, and Risk
slides 20–23Three ways to calculate the operating cash flow
All three assume there is no interest expense — which, per the financing-cost rule, there never is.
| Approach | Formula | Use it when |
|---|---|---|
| Top-down 自上而下 | Sales − Costs − Taxes | You have revenue and cost projections. Do not subtract non-cash deductions — depreciation is not here. |
| Bottom-up 自下而上 | Net income + Depreciation | You already have a projected income statement. Fastest, and it makes the non-cash add-back explicit. |
| Tax shield 税盾法 | (Sales − Costs)(1 − T) + Depreciation × T | Depreciation policy is the question — leasing, or a change in tax regime. Isolates the shield. |
The Baldwin machine is depreciated on a five-year MACRS schedule, which is accelerated: 20% in year 1 rather than the 20% a straight-line method would also give, but 32% in year 2 rather than 20%, and so on.
Acceleration does not change the total depreciation — $100,000 either way. It changes the timing, and timing is value. Shifting depreciation earlier shifts the tax shield earlier, and a dollar of tax saved sooner is worth more than the same dollar saved later.
Take the shield in year 2 alone. Under MACRS the year-2 charge is 32.00, worth 0.34 × 32.00 = 10.88 of tax saved. Under straight-line (20% each year) it would be 0.34 × 20.00 = 6.80. The difference of 4.08 is a real cash advantage, arriving one year earlier than it otherwise would. For a capital-intensive project this is not a rounding detail — it is a large part of why accelerated depreciation is politically contested and why firms lobby over it.
It also explains the year-6 tail. MACRS 5-year property is written off over six tax years because the rates sum to exactly 100% only with that final 5.76%. The Baldwin machine is sold before that tail is claimed, which is precisely why it has a book value of 5.76 at sale — and therefore a taxable gain.
Inflation
The lecture states the rule in one line: in capital budgeting, one must compare real cash flows discounted at real rates, or nominal cash flows discounted at nominal rates. Never mix the two — that is the error, and it is a common one.
The lecture also gives the approximation that everyone actually uses in conversation:
- Exact, from the Fisher equation (1 + real) = 1.10 / 1.05 = 1.047619 real = 4.7619%
- The approximation 10% − 5% = 5.0000%
- The difference 5.0000 − 4.7619 = 0.2381 percentage points
It always overstates, and the error grows with the size of the rates: the cross-product term that the approximation drops is real × inflation. At 4.76% and 5% that is 0.238 points; at 20% and 15% it would be 3 points — large enough to change a decision. Use the approximation for intuition, the exact form for arithmetic.
The rule sounds like bookkeeping hygiene. It is not — the two routes give the same answer only if you are consistent, and mixing them gives a wrong answer that looks perfectly reasonable.
Suppose a project generates a real cash flow of 100 a year for three years, the real discount rate is 6%, and inflation is 4%. Route one, discounting real at real:
PV = 100 × [1 − 1/(1.06)³] / 0.06 = 100 × 2.673012 = 267.30Route two, converting everything to nominal first. The nominal cash flows are 104, 108.16 and 112.49; the nominal rate from Fisher is 1.06 × 1.04 − 1 = 10.24%, not 10%:
PV = 104/(1.1024) + 108.16/(1.1024)² + 112.49/(1.1024)³ = 267.30The same answer, to the cent. But now see what happens when the rule is broken in the two ways it usually is.
Using the approximation 10% instead of the exact 10.24% gives 268.45 against 267.30 — an overstatement of about 1.15, or 0.4%. Small at these rates, but it grows with the horizon and with the size of the rates.
Discounting the nominal cash flows at the real rate of 6% — the actual mixing error, and much the more dangerous of the two — gives 288.82 against the correct 267.30. That is an overstatement of 8.1%. A project appraised that way would look comfortably profitable when it is marginal.
The consistency rule is what guarantees the two routes agree; breaking it is how the error enters. The safe habit is to write the rate and the cash flows down together and check that both are labelled real or both nominal before touching the calculator.
Risk analysis
The lecture's closing observation is that the key inputs — future cash flows and the discount rate — are estimates, not facts. The response is not to pretend otherwise but to see how much the answer moves when the inputs do.
Change one input at a time and observe the effect on NPV. How does NPV change if revenues rise 10%? The virtue is identifying which assumptions the decision actually depends on — usually far fewer than the model contains.
Change several inputs together in a coherent story — a recession scenario, a competitive-entry scenario — each with a probability. Captures the fact that bad things tend to arrive together: volumes fall and prices fall and costs rise.
A step beyond both. Rather than choosing a few scenarios by hand, specify a probability distribution for each input and let the computer draw thousands of combinations. The name comes from the casino.
- Specify the basic model — the NPV formula, with its inputs named NPV = f(units, price, cost per unit, tax rate, discount rate, …)
- Specify a distribution for each variable — not a single number but a range and a shape units ~ Normal(8,000, 1,500) price ~ Normal(20, 2) …
- The computer draws one outcome — one value from each distribution units = 7,340 price = 19.12 … → one NPV
- Repeat, e.g. 10,000 times — yielding 10,000 NPVs, not one
- Calculate the distribution of NPV — mean, spread, and the probability of a negative NPV
Ross Ch. 7 is candid about the limitations, and the exam may reward knowing them.
Sensitivity analysis has a known flaw: it changes one variable at a time, but real variables move together. If demand falls, price usually falls too. Sensitivity analysis will therefore systematically understate how bad the bad case is. Its real value is diagnostic — identifying which variable the decision hinges on — rather than predictive.
Monte Carlo's weakness is the opposite: it is only as good as the distributions you feed it, and those distributions are themselves guesses. There is a temptation to treat a simulation's output as objective because a computer produced it. It is not — it is your assumptions, propagated. The technique's genuine contribution is to make the shape of the risk visible, which a point estimate cannot do.
Ross also covers two techniques the lecture does not reach: break-even analysis, which solves for the sales level at which NPV is zero (and for the accounting break-even, at which net income is zero — a different and much less useful number), and real options, the recognition that a manager can expand, defer or abandon a project as information arrives, which is worth something and which plain NPV ignores entirely.
Formula Sheet
print-friendlyKey Concepts
the vocabularySelf-Check
16 questions · gradedThe examinable core of this lecture is the Baldwin analysis and the six relevance rules that drive it. If you can reproduce the first table and explain why the marketing test is missing from it, everything else follows.
A · Concept check
The general reason. Earnings are an accrual construct, shaped by accounting elections that have nothing to do with cash. Two identical projects can report different net income purely because they chose different depreciation methods. Cash flows are what the firm actually receives and pays, and they are the only thing the discounting machinery of Lecture 2 can operate on.
The specific items. Four bridges from net income to cash:
- Depreciation — deducted to reach net income (lowering it and the tax bill) but involving no cash outflow. Added back in full. In Baldwin year 1, net income of 19.80 becomes operating cash flow of 39.80 once the 20.00 of depreciation is restored.
- Changes in working capital — accrual accounting books revenue when earned, not when collected. Rising receivables and inventory consume cash that profit never reflects.
- Capital spending — the purchase of fixed assets does not appear in net income at all, beyond its depreciation. It is a cash outflow nonetheless, and often the largest one.
- Taxes actually paid — deferred tax charges reduce reported income without cash leaving the firm, in the same way depreciation does.
The consequence. A firm can be profitable and still run out of cash. Free cash flow is what is left after funding the investments the going concern requires, and it is that figure — not earnings — which determines what the project is worth.
B · Multiple choice
C · Applied calculation
Step 1 — annual depreciation. Straight-line over three years:
300,000 / 3 = 100,000 per yearStep 2 — annual operating cash flow.
EBIT = 400,000 − 150,000 − 100,000 = 150,000 Tax = 150,000 × 0.30 = 45,000 FCF = EBIT − Tax + Depreciation − ΔWC − Capex = 150,000 − 45,000 + 100,000 − 0 − 0 = 205,000 per yearCross-check with the tax shield form: (400,000 − 150,000) × 0.70 + 100,000 × 0.30 = 175,000 + 30,000 = 205,000. Matches.
Step 3 — assemble the cash flows. The working capital is an outflow at t = 0 and an inflow at t = 3. Note that it is not deducted from the annual operating cash flow — only the change in working capital enters FCF, and there is none in years 1 and 2.
t = 0: −300,000 − 25,000 = −325,000 t = 1: 205,000 t = 2: 205,000 t = 3: 205,000 + 25,000 = 230,000Step 4 — discount at 10%.
−325,000 / 1.000 = −325,000.00 205,000 / 1.100 = 186,363.64 205,000 / 1.210 = 169,421.49 230,000 / 1.331 = 172,802.40 ─────────── NPV = 203,587.53Answer. NPV = $203,587.53. Accept the project. The margin is comfortable — roughly 63% of the initial outlay — so this decision is not sensitive to small errors in the estimate.
Two things to notice. First, the $25,000 of working capital costs less than $25,000 in present value terms, because it comes back: its net present value is −25,000 + 25,000/1.331 = −$6,217. Second, the depreciation tax shield contributes 100,000 × 0.30 = $30,000 a year, or about $74,600 of present value — over a third of the total NPV comes from the tax treatment of the equipment, not from its operation.
Step 1 — book value at the end of year 5. The 5-year MACRS schedule claims 20% + 32% + 19.2% + 11.52% + 11.52% = 94.24% over five years; the final 5.76% would be claimed in year 6, but the machine is sold first.
Book value = 500,000 × (1 − 0.9424) = 500,000 × 0.0576 = 28,800Step 2 — taxable gain.
Gain = 120,000 − 28,800 = 91,200Step 3 — tax due and after-tax salvage.
Tax = 91,200 × 0.34 = 31,008 After-tax salvage = 120,000 − 31,008 = 88,992Answer. Book value $28,800; tax $31,008; after-tax salvage $88,992.
If it sold for $20,000 instead. Market value of $20,000 is now below the book value of $28,800, so the sale generates a capital loss of $8,800 rather than a gain. Assuming the loss is deductible against other taxable income, it produces a tax credit:
Loss = 20,000 − 28,800 = −8,800 Tax credit = 8,800 × 0.34 = +2,992 After-tax salvage = 20,000 + 2,992 = 22,992The after-tax salvage value of $22,992 exceeds the $20,000 sale price. That is not an anomaly — it is the depreciation schedule unwinding. The firm over-depreciated the machine relative to its actual decline in value, and the tax system refunds part of that when the asset is disposed of below book value.
Route 1 — real cash flows at the real rate.
Annuity factor, 3 yrs @ 6% = [1 − 1/(1.06)³] / 0.06 = 2.673012 PV = 100 × 2.673012 = 267.30Route 2 — convert everything to nominal. The nominal cash flows grow with inflation; the nominal rate comes from the Fisher equation, not from adding 6% and 4%.
Nominal rate = (1.06 × 1.04) − 1 = 0.1024 → 10.24% Nominal cash flows: 100 × 1.04¹ = 104.0000 100 × 1.04² = 108.1600 100 × 1.04³ = 112.4864 PV = 104.0000/1.1024 + 108.1600/1.1024² + 112.4864/1.1024³ = 94.2394 + 88.9903 + 84.0706 = 267.30The two routes agree to the cent. That agreement is the whole point of the consistency rule, and it is not a coincidence — it is guaranteed by using the Fisher rate rather than the approximation.
What goes wrong if you mix them. Discounting the nominal cash flows at the real rate of 6% — the actual error, and an easy one to make when the two numbers sit on different lines of your spreadsheet:
PV = 104/1.06 + 108.16/1.06² + 112.4864/1.06³ = 288.82That is 288.82 against the correct 267.30 — an overstatement of 8.1%. A project appraised this way would look comfortably profitable when it is marginal, and the error grows with both the inflation rate and the project's horizon. The safeguard is procedural rather than intellectual: label every rate and every cash flow as real or nominal before starting the arithmetic, and check that the labels match.
Roadmap · Weeks 5–16
Where the course goes next
and what each week will connect back toStock Valuation
- Dividend discount model; the growing perpetuity first met in Lecture 2
- Constant-growth (Gordon) model and where it breaks
- NPVGO — growth opportunities as positive-NPV projects, tying back to Lecture 3
- Price–earnings and market-to-book, the market ratios already introduced in Lecture 1
Bond Valuation
- Coupon bonds as an annuity plus a lump sum — Lecture 2's two building blocks
- Yield to maturity as an IRR, with the same reinvestment caveat as Lecture 3
- Term structure, spot rates, and why the Fisher equation from Lecture 4 matters here
- Interest-rate risk, duration, and the premium/discount price relation
Return and Risk
- Holding-period returns, arithmetic vs geometric averages
- Variance, covariance, diversification — the portfolio frontier
- CAPM, beta, and the security market line
- This is where the discount rate used throughout Lectures 3–4 finally gets its justification
Tutorial
- Problem session; no new material
Cost of Capital & Efficient Capital Markets
- Cost of equity via CAPM; cost of debt; WACC as a weighted average
- WACC is the number the "discount rate" in Lectures 3–4 has been standing in for
- Flotation costs, divisional cost of capital, and when WACC is the wrong rate
- Market efficiency: the random walk, event studies, and the behavioural critique
Capital Structure
- Modigliani–Miller without taxes, then with taxes
- Interest tax shield — the mirror image of the depreciation tax shield in Lecture 4
- Financial distress costs, agency costs, pecking order, trade-off theory
- Answers the "financing decision" left open at the end of Lecture 1
Raising Capital
- Venture capital, IPO, seasoned equity offerings
- Underpricing, the winner's curse, and the long-run underperformance puzzle
- Back to the 康希诺 A/H price gap from Lecture 1's opening case
Payout Policy
- Dividends vs share repurchases; the irrelevance proposition
- Dividend clienteles, signalling, and the tax argument
- Reads directly off the retained-earnings / dividend split in the Lecture 1 income statement
Tutorial
- Problem session; groups prepare presentations
Review & Student Presentations
- Group presentations (20% of the grade)
- Course review ahead of the closed-book final
Delivered
these are written up in fullOverview & Financial Statements
Time Value of Money
Net Present Value
Capital Budgeting
Group project · 20%
presentations begin 1 DecemberThe syllabus asks each group to pick a course-related topic that was not taught in class, and structure the presentation around three things: what the concept is, how it is used in the real world, and how it connects back to this course. Ten to twenty minutes. The instructor's own suggestions are LPR, fintech, independent directors, ESG and generative AI.
The third requirement — the link back to the course — is the one groups routinely under-prepare, and it is also the one the marking most rewards. Each of these topics lands on a specific piece of machinery from Lectures 1–4:
The loan prime rate is the risk-free benchmark that sits inside every discount rate. A presentation here can trace one number from the PBoC's fixing through to the WACC used to appraise a project — the LPR feeds the cost of debt, which feeds the discount rate, which decides whether the NPV in Lecture 3 is positive.
Where technology lowers the cost of the information that Lecture 1 argued investors are short of. Mobile payment, credit scoring and robo-advice all attack the same friction: the analyst's role as an information intermediary.
Directly the corporate-governance block of Lecture 1. China's 独立董事 regime is a regulatory answer to the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders — the 刘强东 case, with the mechanism spelled out.
ESG is the syllabus's own amendment to the goal of the firm — maximise value, but observed through environmental, social and governance screens rather than profit alone. Generative AI, meanwhile, arrives on the analyst's desk: it is a tool for the valuation work of Lectures 2–4, and worth a candid assessment of where it helps and where it feeds you confident nonsense.
Open with a number, not a definition. "LPR" is a definition; "a 35-basis-point cut in the 5-year LPR lowers the monthly payment on a ¥1m 30-year mortgage by ¥210, which is a transfer of roughly ¥75,000 of NPV from banks to households" is an argument — and it uses Lecture 2's annuity formula to make it. Then say which lecture each piece comes from. That is the link requirement, discharged.